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I.

INTRODUCTION

Public employees have traditionally found themselves subject to greater regulation than is imposed upon their counterparts in private industry. The bulk of
this regulation arises from the peculiar position of the public employee as the
provider of basic and necessary services to his fellow citizens which must not be
interrupted. This Survey Note seeks to examine the regulation of public employees
in three areas in which limitations have been considered particularly necessary
because of the peculiar position of the public employee as the servant of the citizenry: participation in political activities, labor relations including the rights to
organize, bargain collectively and strike, and, conflicts of interest. While the discussion of these three topics is somewhat critical and evaluative, it is aimed principally at an exposition of the present law with indications of trends where possible.

NOTE
This treatment is generally limited to the law as it -affects state employees as
oplosed to those employed by the federal government or by municipalities. However, federal and municipal law is discussed where it sheds light upon state legislation and decisions.
The initial topic considered is the limitation upon the rights of state employees
to participate in political activities. Regulation in this area is both traditional and
widespread- traditional in that such regulation has long been imposed seemingly
without a great deal of reflection and widespread in that almost every state has
some kind or another of restriction on its employees' political activities. The initial
section of the Survey examines the great mass of legislation dealing with the right
of state employees to participate in politics as well as the judicial interpretations
of this legislation. The analysis of the law in this area is quite exhaustive and
features a classification of the statutory materials into a number of basic types, one
of which is found in most states which impose political restrictions upon their
employees.
The second major section of the Survey, dealing with organization, collective
bargaining and strikes, concerns itself with an analysis of the problems facing state
employees in their efforts to attain a more favorable relationship with their government-employer by means of which grievances and demands for better pay and
working conditions may be met in an orderly fashion. Public employees have long
been denied the same organizational freedom which is enjoyed by their counterparts in private industry. However, an examination of the legislation and judicial
decisions in this area reveals a trend toward increased union activity on the part
of public employees at every level. This section of the Survey probes the distinctions between public and private employees which formed the basis of the denial
of organizational rights in the past and seeks to indicate how these distinctions
have been discarded or modified in those instances which account for the trend
toward increased organizational freedom.
As regards strikes, while the denial to Public employees of the right to strike
remains steadfast, the alternative methods of settling disputes, mediation and
arbitration, are becoming more widely accepted, thus affording public employees
the outlet which they seek for presenting demands and grievances to their employer.
The once ironclad prohibition against bargaining with public employees has been
gradually deteriorating so that it may now be said that collective bargaining is
becoming the rule rather than the exception. The discussion of collective bargaining and the strike includes an analysis of the arguments for and against the use
of these devices with regard to public employees as well as a presentation of selected
examples illustrating the impact of collective bargaining in those localities which
have made it a part of the government, employer-employee relation.
The final topic is conflicts of interest. These arise from the demand for
complete loyalty to the public service as contrasted with the private interests of
the individual employees. State legislation is replete with every manner of law
proscribing various and sundry forms of beneficial interests in public dealings, and
numerous, though often illusory, 'exemptions to the prohibitions. This legislation
spans the range of effectiveness, from muddled and vague provisions, subject to
a myriad of interpretations in an area, e.g., such as public contracts, to the rigid
and exacting restrictions aimed at nepotism. A bright spot may be emerging, however, in legislative attempts to .accurately define standards of conduct in the form
of codes of ethics. Such codes are admirable attempts to take a logical and reasoned
approach to the problems.
II. RIGHT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES TO PARTICIPATE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
A. Introduction:
This section seeks to examine the restrictions placed upon the political activities of public employees. Most states have imposed such restrictions, their purpose
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being to maintain the integrity of the state service against possible political corruption. Because of the great wealth of material available on this topic, it has been
necessary to limit the scope of the discussion in several ways. First, the emphasis
is upon restrictions on state employees, and state action in the field in general.
Hence municipal, county or federal employees are mentioned only when their
activities are regulated by state action or when decisions and legislation concerning
such employees are helpful in interpreting state decisions and legislation. Secondly,
the type of restrictions considered here are principally those upon voluntary political
activities of the kind in which the ordinary citizen might be expected to participate.
Thus, prohibitions of forced contributions or services, enforced by superiors against
their subordinates under threats of the latter's employment status being somehow
affected, are somewhat beyond the scope of this section of the survey. Such prohibitions may almost be taken for granted as a necessary adjunct to a healthy state
employment system. However, provisions regarding forced contributions or services will be mentioned in connection with states where there are no other political
activity- provisions or where helpful in treating matters properly within the scope
of discussion.
B. Federal Legislation Affecting State Employees:
It may seem strange after an introduction emphasizing the focus of this survey
upon state activity to plunge initially into federal legislation. However there are
good reasons for this approach. The first is that the principal federal legislation,
the Hatch Act,' is probably the best known enactment relating to political activity.
A consideration of this Act, with which the reader is probably somewhat familiar,
will serve as an effective orientation to the great mass of state legislation which
follows. Moreover, viewed against the background of the Hatch Act and the decisions interpreting it, the disparate approaches taken in the legislation of the various
states are more readily understood. Finally, and more importantly, the Hatch
Act itself contains political prohibitions which apply to those state and local
employees whose "principal employment is in connection
with any activity which
2
is financed in whole or in part" by federal funds.
The passage just quoted is a part of section 12(a) of the Hatch Act. That
section restricts the activities of certain state employees as follows:
(a) No officer or employee of any State or local agency whose principal employment is in connection with any activity which is financed in
whole or in part by loans or grants made by the United States or by any
Federal agency shall (1) use his official authority or influence for the
purpose of interfering with an election or a nomination for office, or affecting the result thereof, or (2) directly or indirectly coerce, attempt to
coerce, command, or advise any other such officer or employee to pay, lend,
or contribute any part of his salary or compensation or anything else of
value to any party, committee, organization, agency, or person for political
purposes. No such officer or employee shall take any active part in political management or in political campaigns. All such persons shall retain
the right to vote as they may choose and to express their opinions on all
political subjects and candidates. For the purposes of the second sentence
of this subsection, the term "officer or employee" shall not be construed
to include (1) the Governor or the Lieutenant Governor of any State or
any person who is authorized by law to act as Governor, or the mayor
of any city; (2) duly elected heads of executive departments of any State
or municipality who are not classified under a State or municipal merit
or civil-service system; (3) officers holding elective offices.3

Section 18 of the Act exempts from the prohibitions of the second sentence of
section 12(a) activities in4 connection with elections which do not concern national
or state issues or parties.
1 53 Stat. 1148 (1939), 54 Stat. 767 (1940), as amended 5 U.S.C. § 118i-n (1958),
as amended 5 U.S.C. §§ 118(i)(b), 118(k)(b) (Supp. V. 1964).
2 54 Stat. 767 (1940), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 118k(a) (1958).
3 Ibid.
4 54 Stat. 767 (1940), 5 U.S.C. § 118n (1958).
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Section 12(a) of the Hatch Act, like its section 9(a) 5 counterpart which contains the prohibitions against federal employee political activity, is administered
by the United States Civil Service Commission. Section 12(b) defines the basic
procedures to be followed by the Commission in state employee political activity
cases.8 The penalty imposed if it is found that the state has not removed a delinquent employee as requested by the Commission is the withholding from the
federal grants to the state a sum equal to two years' compensation of the employee
who has violated the Act.7 Although the substantive provisions of political activity
are the real subject matter of this portion of the survey and the intricacies of
procedure are beyond its scope, it might be noted at this point that many of the
states employ a similar scheme in imposing and enforcing their political restrictions
i.e., a civil service law containing the substantive prohibitions and a commission to determine violations and recommend dismissal, the most frequently utilized
penalty for violations.8
Putting aside administrative procedure and returning to section 12(a), a
number of questions concerning that section arise. It would seem initially that
there could be constitutional problems in view of the limitations imposed upon
free participation in the fullness of the democratic process of government. Are
there considerations of policy which justify this interference with constitutional
rights? Moreover, what does the jurisdictional standard "principal employment
in connection with" mean? Finally, what are the actual activities proscribed by
the language "active part in political management or in political campaigns"?
Though the judicial interpretations of the Hatch Act are numerically not impressive, they do answer these important basic questions.
The constitutionality of the Act and its underlying policy and purposes were
considered by the Supreme Court in the cases of United Public Workers v. MitchelP
and Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission.' United Public Workers
involved a section 9(a) violation by a federal employee but is applicable here for
its consideration of the general question of the constitutionality of the substantive
activity prohibitions. Oklahoma was concerned with section 12(a), specifically
with the claim that the section was an unconstitutional invasion of the powers
reserved to the states by the tenth amendment. The Court in Oklahoma deferred
to the opinion in United Public Workers on the question of the constitutionality
of the substantive prohibitions as limiting rights to free participation in government.
In considering the constitutional issue in United Public Workers, the Court
found it necessary to enunciate the purposes of the Act, for it viewed the resolution of the constitutional question as the proper striking of a balance between the
limitations imposed on political freedom and the reasons for such an imposition.
"Again this Court must balance the extent of the guarantees of freedom
against a congressional enactment to protect a democratic society against the
supposed evil of political partisanship by classified employees of government."'"
The purposes of this kind of legislation were found to be worthy ones long
before the passage of the Hatch Act. The Court relied substantially on the 1882
decision in Ex parte Curtis'2 for its statement of the policy underlying the Act.
That case involved the validity of a federal statute prohibiting federal employees
5 53 Stat. 1148 (1939), as amended 5 U.S.C. § ll8i(a) (1958).
6 54 Stat. 767 (1940), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 118k(b) (Supp. V. 1964). For the
Civil Service Commission's Rules of Practice in proceedings involving political activity violations by state employees see 5 C.F.R. § 151.101-.124 (1964).
7 54 Stat. 767 (1340), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 118(k)(b) (Supp. V. 1964).
8 See note 114 infra.
9 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
10 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
11 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96 (1947).
12 106 U.S. 371 (1882).
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from giving, receiving or soliciting funds for political purposes from other employees. In Curtis, the Court said:
The evident purpose of Congress in all this class of enactments has
been to promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties,
and to maintain proper discipline in the public service. Clearly such a
purpose is within the just scope of legislative power ....
If contributions from those in public employment may be solicited
by others in official authority, it is easy to see that what begins as a request
may end as a demand, and that a failure to meet the demand may be
treated by those having the power of removal as a breach of some supposed
duty, growing out of the political relations of the parties .... 14

The Court in United Public Workers adopted this rationale and struck the balance
on the side of constitutionality.
Congress and the administrative agencies have authority over the discipline and efficiency of the public seryice. When actions of civil servants
in the judgment of Congress menace the integrity and the competency of
the service, legislation to forestall such danger and adequate to maintain
its usefulness is required. The Hatch Act is the answer of Congress to
this need. We cannot5 say with such a background that these restrictions
are unconstitutional.'
In Oklahoma, the state instituted an action to review a determination of the
Civil Service Commission that a member of the state highway commission be
removed from his position for violation of section 12(a). The official in question,
while engaged in work financed by federal funds, had served as chairman of the
State Democratic Central Committee. During his chairmanship there was no
general election in the state. However, he did participate in such activities as
advising the governor on fund raising and acting as toastmaster at a fund raising
dinner. The Commission notified the state that such activities constituted a violation of the Hatch Act and warranted removal. Its determination was upheld
by the Svpreme Court. Specifically, the Court met the tenth amendment challenge
with the argument that, while the federal government "has no power to regulate
. .. local political activities as such of state officials, it does have power to fix the
terms upon which its money allotments to the states shall be disbursed."1 6 A
number of lower federal court cases, before and after Oklahoma, have employed
this same reasoning, emphasizing in addition that the Act does not force a state
to do anything, since it could refuse to discharge an offending employee and
7
thereby take a reduction in the amount of federal funds received.'
Enough said for now on the constitutional question. It will recur at greater
length in the discussion of the state legislation.
Next arises the problem of defining the Civil Service Commission's jurisdiction in 12(a) cases. The terms "principal employment in connection with" projects
supported "in whole or in part" by federal funds, leave something to be desired
as regards specificity. Could it be said that a state employee who spends fifty-one
percent of his working time on a project, ten percent of which is supported by
13

Id. at 373.

14 Id. at 374.
15 330 U.S. 75, 103 (1947). 'Mr. Justice Reed wrote the opinion of the Court. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter was of the opinion that jurisdiction was lacking due to an irregularity
in appellate procedure but concurred on the merits since the Court had in fact assumed
jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Rutledge and Mr. Justice Black dissented on the grounds that the
Act unjustifiably deprived large numbers of employees of their constitutional right to participate in the democratic processes of government. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in part, one
ground being that there was no necessity of regulating the actions of an industrial worker
as the appellant Poole. Thus the decision was an extremely close one, a fact seldom noted
in the many cases which rely on United Public Workers.
16 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947).
17 Palmer v. United States Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 297 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1962); Ohio v.
United States Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 65 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.Ohio 1946); Neustein v. Mitchell,
52 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Stewart v. United States Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 45 F. Supp.
697 (N.D.Ga. 1942).
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federal funds, is covered by section 12(a)? The Civil Service Commission and
the courts have provided guidelines to aid in the answering of such questions.
The Commission, for its part, has adopted "general" and "secondary" rules
of jurisdiction in section 12(a) cases, as follows:"
An officer or employee of a State or local agency is subject to the
Act if, as a normal and foreseeable- incident to his principal position or
job, he performs duties in connection with an activity financed
in whole
or in part by Federal loans or grants; otherwise he is not. s
An employee of a State or local agency is not within the "principal
employment" requirement of Section 12(a) of the Hatch Act, if the only
duties in respect to any activity financed in whole or in part by Federal
loans or grants which he performs as a normal and intended incident of
his principal job or position, are so inconsequential in comparison with
other duties of his said job or position as to make applicable the maxim
"de minimis non curat lex.'2 9

A Commission proceeding involving an employee of the Illinois Highway Depart20
ment conveniently illustrates the mode of application of both jurisdictional rules.
The principal duty of the employee was to supervise the maintenance of completed
highways. Federal funds were not involved in such work since federal contributions for highways are for construction rather than maintenance. However, federal
funds were allocated for "roadside improvement" and supervision of this work

was also a part, though apparently a minor one, of the employee's duties. The
Commission noted that, if judged solely on the basis of the general jurisdiction
rule, the employee in question would have been within the coverage of the Act. 21
However, upon a finding that ". . . only about 1/10 of 1 percent of his time was
devoted to . . ." roadside improvement, it was held that the situation was an

appropriate one for the application of the secondary rule.22 Therefore, the employer
was not within the coverage of section 12(a).
23
A fairly recent decision, Palmer v. United States Civil Service Commission,
indicates a continuing broad sweep of 12(a) jurisdiction. The Commission had
recommended dismissal of Mr. Palmer, Illinois State Director of Conservation,
for activities including service as a precinct committeeman and chairman of the
Kendall County Republican Committee. Its investigation had revealed that during
Palmer's tenure as Director of Conservation, eight percent of the funds expended
by his Department came from federal grants. Palmer claimed that he actually
spent only one percent of his time working on federally supported projects since
two of his subordinates supervised all federal aid projects. This contention was
rejected on the giound that Palmer, as head of the Department, had the last
word on major policy decisions, including approval of plans for undertakings
supported with federal funds. Moreover, six of the Department's nine Divisions
24
received federal aid. Palmer "plainly met the test" of jurisdiction.
The term "principal employment" has required definition, not only in the
sense of principal with reference to the work performed by the employee in his
state job, but also in the sense that the employee has two jobs; one public, the
18 In the Matter of Slaymaker & the State of Illinois, 3 Pike & Fischer Ad. L. (1st ser.)
(Decisions) 41b. 1-3 (U.S. Civ. Serv. Comm'n 1943). This is the "general" rule of juris-

diction. In explaining the rule, the Commission noted:

". .

. we do not divide and weigh

the things which an employee does. We merely analyze the position or
first- whether it is his 'principal' one, and second-whether it involves
foreseeable incident thereof) performance of duties in connection with a
activity... ." In the Matter of Slaymaker, supra at 41b. 1-3.
19 In the Matter of Todd & the State of Illinois, 3 Pike & Fischer
(Decisions) 41b. 1-5, 1-6 (U.S. Civ. Serv. Comm'n 1943).
20 Id. at 41b. 1-5.
21 Id. at 41b. 1-7.
22 Ibid.
23 297 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1962).
24 Id. at 454.

job to determine,
(as a normal and
Federally financed
Ad. L. (lst ser.)
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other private. In Anderson v. United States Civil Service Commission,25 the
employee, an attorney, spent seventy-five percent of his time in the private practice of law, while twenty-five percent was spent as an advisor to the Montana
Department of Public Welfare. It was held that his "principal employment" was
his private law practice. Congress had not intended to impose the prohibitions
of the Act upon persons with two jobs, the more important of which had nothing
to do with federal funds. 6
A number of miscellaneous jurisdictional problems have arisen. In Neustein
2
v. Mitchell,
an employee claimed that his resignation prior to a determination
of violation by the Commission ousted jurisdiction. The District Court for the
Southern District of New York rejected this argument on the ground that the
proceeding to determine whether there has been a violation is against the state
as well as the individual employee. 28 This is so because if the employee has committed a violation and the state re-hires him within eighteen months, federal funds
may be cut off.29 Thus determination of violation is crucial to the determination

of whether re-hiring would give cause to withhold federal aid.3 0 Furthermore if
this were not the rule, it would become a simple matter to avoid the prohibitions
of the Act. In re Higginbotham3 involved an attempt to escape the Commission's
jurisdiction by use of the office-holder exemption provided in the final sentence
of section 12(a). The employee in question worked for the Washington, Pennsyl.
vania, housing authority, an agency receiving federal grants. While so employed
he ran for, and was elected to, the office of alderman. Upon the Commission's
finding of a violation, the employee objected under the 12(a) (3) office holder
exemption. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the exemption was
not applicable since it was not intended to mean office holding incidental to employment in connection with federal funds but rather referred to situations where an
official3 2 is elected to a position in connection with a project financed with federal
funds.

What are the actual activities prohibited by the words "active part in political
management or in political campaigns"? These words can be understood only if
viewed in the proper context. As the Court made clear in United Public Workers,
that context is partisanship:
It is only partisan political activity that is interdicted. It is active par-

ticipation in political management and political campaigns.

Expressions,

public or private, on public affairs, personalities and matters of public

interest, not an objective of party action, are unrestricted by .law so long
as the 33government employee does not direct his activities toward party
SUCCeSS.

Thus the initial inquiry can be rephrased -what
are the actual
prohibited by section 12(a)? First, it is noteworthy that the
of section 9(a) (federal employees) are identical with those of
local employees) .3 The Congressional intent was apparently to

partisan activities
prohibitive words
12(a) (state and
prohibit the same

25 119 F. Supp. 567 (D. Mont. 1954).
26 Id. at 572-73. Accord, Matturri v. United States Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 130 F. Supp.
15 (D.N.J. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 229 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1956) (attorney engaged in private practice while uncompensated member of Newark Housing Authority).
27 52 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
28 Id. at 532.
29 Ibid. This penalty is provided by section 12(b) of the Hatch Act.
30 Ibid.
31 340 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1965).
32 Id. at 167.
33 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947).
34 The words referred to, which are the same in each section, are . . . shall take any
active part in political management or in political campaigns." 53 Stat. 1148 (1949), as
amended, 5 U.S.C. § 118i(a) (1958) and 54 Stat. 767 (1940), as amended 5 U.S.C.
118k(a) (1958).
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activities on the part of both groups of employees.35 Therefore it follows that
whatever kinds of activities have been held to be proscribed for federal employees are likewise restricted for state employees. Some of the specific activities in
which federal employees have been forbidden to participate include service as a
delegate to a political convention, membership on a committee of a political party,
holding positions of leadership in partisan political clubs, acting as a party worker
on election day and running for elective office. 6 Note from what has been prohibited the effect given to the word "management" in section 12(a). While the
employee can belong to a partisan political club, he cannot take part in its leadership by e.g., being a member of a steering committee or addressing the club members in an effort to influence a partisan course of action.3 7 By the latter activities
the employee would be taking part in management.
Partisanship and leadership, or more accurately, an active attempt to influence
partisan action by others, seem to be the key elements in any offense under the
Act. These requirements are certainly met if the employee is a member of a committee of a political party. Partisanship would be present by virtue of the fact that
a party is involved, while the leadership requirement would be met because a
committee is presumably a guiding force in the party organization. The violation
is even clearer in a case like Oklahoma where the employee was chairman of a
state-wide committee.38 As the court in Oklahoma emphasized by its statement
that there was no general election in the state during the period of the alleged
violation, 9 the activity of the transgressing employee need not have any connection
with an actual election campaign. It may still fall under the heading of political
management. .
"Other decisions typify the kinds of situations in which the twofold requirement of partisanship and active attempt to influence the activities of others are
met. In Utah v. United States,40 various state agencies were assigned quotas of
tickets for a fifty-dollar a plate dinner planned by a political party. The Director
of the State Road Commission received some of the tickets and passed them on
to one ,Bridge, Chief of the Right of Way Division. Bridge and two of his assodates "recommended" to the employees in the division that they contribute toward
the price of the tickets. The quota was met after a meeting at which the employees
were told that they might not get an expected pay increase unless they helped the
party involved. Bridge and his two associates were dismissed for violations of section 12(a). However, the Road Commissioner who had initiated this chain of events
within the Department was not dismissed upon a finding that he was not subject
to the provisions of the Act. Thus the case stands for the added proposition that
activities in violation of the Act are not justified because
they are carried out under
the orders of a superior, unless duress is present.41
35

UNITED STATES CIV. SERV. COMM'N

PAMPHLET 20,

p.

18

(1964).

[Hereinafter cited

as Pamphlet 20.] Section 15 of the Hatch Act, 54 Stat. 767, as amended 5 U.S.C. § 1181
(1958), provides that all persons to whom the political restrictions of the Act apply are
prohibited from participating in such activities as the Civil Service Commission had determined, before the passage of the Act, were prohibited on the part of U.S. Civil Service
employees. Thus state and federal employees are subjected to the same restrictions. In
Oklahoma, the Court stated: "By this section [§ 15] Congress made the test of political

activities for state employees the same as the test then in effect for employees in the classified civil service." 330 U.S. 127, 144. For an excellent discussion of section 15, and also.
of sections 9(a) and 12(a) of the Hatch Act, see Rose, A Critical Look at the Hatch Act,.
75 HAxv. L. RPv. 510 (1962).

36

PAMPHLET

20, pp.10-16. This pamphlet isin effect a summary of the Hatch Act

restrictions on federal, state and local employees, as determined from the Commission's &
the courts' applications of the Act.

37

PAMPHLET

38

See text accompanying note 16 supra.

20 at 11.

39 330 U.S. 127, 132 (1947).
40 286 F.2d 30 (10th Cir. 1961).
41 Id. at 34.
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One final area of the substantive prohibitions which could conceivably give
some trouble is the extent of an employee's right to express his opinion on a political subject or candidate. How far may an employee go in expressing his opinion
without running afoul of the dual requirements of partisanship and direct attempt
to influence others toward partisan action? The Civil Service Rules in effect prior
42
to the passage of the Hatch Act allowed only "private" expressions of opinion.
4
In
The present Act contains no such qualification of the right of expression.
an opinion a few years after the Hatch Act was passed, the Attorney General of
the United States stated that a public expression of opinion is not violative of the
Act, "provided it is not such as to constitute taking an active part in political management or in political campaigns. '44 This basic position was adhered to in Wilson
v. United States Civil Service Commission,45 a case involving an employee of the
Post Office Department who had written a letter, which appeared in the Houston
Post, urging defeat of a partisan candidate. The court stated that section 9(a)
of the Act gives employees the right to express their opinions and that the right
of the organized
endures even "when it might chance to parallel the positions
parties so long as it is not part of organized political activity. ' 46 It was found that
the letter, on its face, did not reveal active participation in partisan politics "al' 47
though.., an intent to influence the thoughts or actions of others can be assumed.
This concludes the discussion of the Hatch Act - its constitutionality and
underlying policy, the criterion of jurisdiction for state employees, and its substantive prohibitions. The purpose in considering it has been twofold; first, to
study the provisions which affect state employees and secondly, as a prelude to
examination of similar state legislation. It might be noted in passing that the
Hatch Act has been subjected to some rather heavy criticism. s ,A critique of it
here would be inappropriate since the principal focus of this work is upon state
activity. Moreover, a number of the objections to the Hatch Act can also be made
against the state legislation. These will be discussed in greater detail below.
C. State Legislation
As stated in the introduction, almost every state has some kind of statutory
provision concerned with political activities of its employees. There is such great
variety in this legislation that it practically defies summary and generalization.
However, an attempt will be made here to classify the political activity restrictions
into basic patterns in order to gain a clearer understanding of their nature and
scope. This systematic approach seems to be the only suitable manner in which
to cover the subject.
It should be emphasized again that the principal focus of this section of the
survey is upon the substantive provisions of the state legislation- i.e., the specific activities which are proscribed. Therefore, before delving into the classification of such provisions, it would be well to dispense preliminarily with certain
matters which are not substantive but which are nevertheless important to a
thorough understanding of the topic under consideration.
The first of these matters is the breadth of coverage of the various state
enactments. It is one thing to say that a state has political activity legislation but
it is another question entirely as to which employees within the state are affected
by the prohibitions. A majority of the states impose- restrictions upon their em42 40 Ops. AT-r'y GEN. 15, 20 (1941).

43 Id. at 20-27.
44 Id. at 27.
45 136 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1955).
46 Id. at 106.
47 Ibid.
48 E.g., Rose, supra note 35; Note, The Hatch Act-Political Immaturity, 45 GEo.
L.J. 233 (1956-57).
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ployees through a civil service, merit or personnel system.4" This is of course the
approach utilized in the Hatch Act as it affects federal employees. 50 Such states
have enacted civil service laws which contain prohibitions of political activity
applicable to all classified employees in the state civil service. 51 This approach
leaves unrestricted the unclassified employees. A few states apply political restric-"
tions to all state employees, whether in the classified service or not.52 Some states
have no restrictive provisions of general applicability to classified or unclassified
employees but rather impose 'limitations on employees of specific state agencies.53
Still other states impose direct restrictions upon all public employees, including those
at the county and municipal levels. 54 Finally, a number of states impose no direct
prohibitions on any employees but delegate to lower level governmental units the
power to organize a system of employee classification with a direction that certain
political restrictions be imposed on the employees so classified. 5 Of course, various
combinations of these methods of coverage are used in a number of states. 5
The second preliminary consideration is 'the scope of the inquiry into the
prohibitions of political activity. Again it must be noted that almost every state
may be expected to have restrictions with respect to forcing contributions of money
or services by public employees under threats of their employment status being
somehow affected. The focus here is upon-prohibitions of voluntary participation
in political activities which are arguably not as -necessary for the preservation of
an efficient state service. Prohibitions of forced activities will be mentioned only
if they are the sole type of restriction imposed by the state.
1. Legislation applicable to all state or all classified employees.
With the ground now cleared, the substance of the restrictions upon political
activity can be examined. First to be considered are provisions of general or
state-wide applicability. At the risk of over-simplification, it can be said that there
are two general categories of prohibitions found in the state legislation: (1) those
restricting solicitation and/or contribution of funds for political purposes, and
(2) those proscribing active participation in party and campaign affairs. Many
states have enacted both of these types of restrictions. They are found both in
statutes and in state personnel or civil service rules.
49 An enumeration of these states would prove to be repetitious since all statutes imposing
restrictions through civil service systems, etc., will be discussed in this section. For a brief
discussion of political restrictions imposed through civil service laws, see KAPLAN, LAW OF
Crvir SERVICE 341-50 (1958).
50 This statement merits a slight qualification. Section 9(a) of the Act applies to persons "employed in the executive branch of the Federal Government, or any agency of
department thereof. . . ." 53 Stat. 1148 (1939), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § ll8i(a) (1958).
However, the great bulk of such employees are in the classified service and the Civil Service
Commission administers the political activity prohibitions as to them. For employees who
are not classified under the Civil Service Act, the employing authority must see to it that
the Act's restrictions are enforced. See PAMPHLET 20, pp. 5-6.
51 E.g., ALA. CoDE tit. 55, § 317 (1958). In some states, almost all employees may
be in the classified service. Connecticut, which also imposes its restrictions through a civil
service law, CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 5-61 (1958), numbers 25,000 of the state's 27,000
employees in the classified service. Letter from George J. Walker, Personnel Director, State
of 'Connecticut, to NOTRE DAME LAWYER, Feb. 9, 1965, on file in office of NOTRE DAME
LAWYER.
52 E.g., CAL. GoV'T CODE §

19730, prohibiting a "state officer or employee" from soliciting
or receiving funds for political purposes.
53 E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-11-21 (1953), prohibiting political activities by members of the Highway Patrol.
54 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.31 (1960): "N6 officer or employee of the state, or any
county or municipality thereof . . ." may participate in the restricted activities.
55 E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 23B, § 70(a) (1957), prohibiting certain political activities
on the part of town employees if the town creates a merit system for its employees.
56 E.g., Florida, in addition to the restrictions upon all state, county and municipal
employees, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.31 (1960), supra note 54, has prohibitions which apply
only to classified employees. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 110.13 (1960).
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a. Solicitation-contributionprovisions
Considering first solicitation and/or contribution for political purposes, the
provisions usually take one of three general forms: (1) prohibition of both solicita.tion and contribution; (2) prohibition of solicitation only; (3) prohibition of forced
contributions only.
The Alabama statute and State Personnel Board rule are typical of the restrictions upon both solicitation and contribution. Both provide as follows:
No employee in the classified service, and no member of the board shall,
directly or indirectly, pay or promise to pay any assessment, subscription,
or contribution for any political organization or purpose, or solicit or take
any part in soliciting any such assessment, subscription, or contribution. No
subscription, or contribution of
person shall solicit any such assessment,
57
an employee in the classified service.
s
and in several of these
Nine other states have restrictions to the same effect

the prohibition is in substantially the same language as the Alabama provision
herein set out. 9
Typical of the provisions prohibiting only solicitation of funds for political
purposes is the California statute:
A State officer or employee shall not, directly or indirectly, solicit or
receive, or be in any manner concerned in soliciting or receiving, any
assessment, subscription, contribution, or political service, whether voluntary or involuntary, for any political purpose whatever, from any one on
lists or holding any position under this part or board
the 6employment
0
rule.
1
Thirteen other states impose a similar restriction," again some6 2 of these being
statute.
California
the
as
couched in substantially the same terms
6
The
Eight states prohibit only forced contributions for political purposes.
language of these prohibitions is not nearly so uniform from state to state as the
two types discussed previously, but the Alaska statute is typical at least in indicating
the general tenor of this type of restriction:
"No person may require an assessment, subscription, contribution, or service
for a political party from an employee in the classified service."',
There are several miscellaneous types of solicitation- contribution prohibitions
in addition to the three principal types outlined. The Montana and New Hamp57 ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 317 (1958). Rules of the State Personnel Board (rev., 1956)
§ 14(d), adopt the words of the statute verbatim. This is a not uncommon practice. 58
Conn., Regs. of the Civ. Serv. Comm'n, State Personnel Bd., §14-13 (1961); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 110.13(3) (1960); Ga., Georgia State Personnel Bd. Rules and Regs., Rule 3, par.
3.104; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24!/2, § 38t (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964); IOWA CODE ANN. §
365.29 (1946); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18.310 (3) (1963); LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15
(N)(3) and La. Civ. Serv. Rules, 14.1B (1963); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 240.705, 260.230
(Supp. 1963); WEST VA. CODE § 2835(17)(d) (1961). See KAPLAN, op. cit. supra note
49, at 343.
59 E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18.310(3) (1963).
60 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19730.
61 HAWAI REV. LAWS § 3-70(d) (1955); IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-1341 (repl. vol. 1961);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 63, § 25 (1954); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, § 11 (1964); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 43.28 (1961); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 36.150(4) (1949) and Rules and Rags.
Personnel Div., Rule 15.4(b); Omo REV. CODE ANN*. § 143.41 (Page 1953); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 74, § 818 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741. 905 (1962); R. I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 36-4-53 (1956) and Merit System Rule 36-4-53 (repetition of statute verbatim);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-3121 (1956); Vt. Civ. Serv. Rules quoted in letter From Mr. Claude
Magnant, to NOTRE DAME LAWYER, Feb. 16, 1965, on file in office of NOTRE DA.ME
LAWYER; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 16.30 (1957).
62 E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 818 (1965).
63 ALASKA STAT. § 39.25.160(c) (Supp. 1962); Idaho, S.B. No. 69 § 11(l)(b), 1965
Sess., Idaho Legislature; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2953 (1964); Rules of the Civ. Serv.
Comm'n, State of Michigan, Rule 7.2 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-42A (Supp. 1963);
N.Y. Cxv. SERV. LAW § 107(3); Trx. PEN. CODE art. 195. 259 (1952); WASHt. REV. CODE

W.

§ 41.06.250(1) (Supp. 1964).
64 ALASKA STAT. § 39.25.160(c)

(Supp. 1962).
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shire statutes appear to prohibit only contributions.65 Florida's restriction is bor-

rowed from section 12(a) of the Hatch Act.6 6 In some states where nothing is
said specifically about solicitation or contribution, and even in some states where
reference is made to these matters, it is possible that such activity is proscribed
by the more general restrictions upon participation in political activities.
Judicial interpretations of the legislation and regulations thus far discussed
are dealt with below at the completion of the treatment of all statutory and quasistatutory materials. However, since there is little judicial treatment of many political restrictions, a few remarks with reference to such restrictions might be appropriate immediately after their terms are set out. As regards the solicitation-contribution form of restriction, there would seem to be some question of the necessity
for prohibiting voluntary, unsolicited, private political contributions. Yet a fair
reading of some of the provisions discussed indicates that their intent is to prohibit
such contributions. There would seem to be little danger of political corruption
in the state service, in the form of favoritism or discrimination, from such contributions except in the rare instances where the contribution would be on behalf
of an official who could and would exercise influence upon the contributor's employment status. More often than not the contribution would be to a candidate at
most remotely connected with the contributor's employee status, if indeed the candidate ever learned of the specific contribution. It is not necessary to prohibit all
contributions in order to avoid a few potentially dangerous situations. On the
other hand, prohibitions of merely forced contributions would not seem to go far
enough. There are many subtle forms of pressure which could escape the proscriptions of this type of regulation. An acceptable middle ground as regards restriction upon contributions might be to prohibit contributions for candidates and purposes which can reasonably be expected to have an effect on the contributor's
employment status. Prohibition of solicitation of contributions from and by public
employees seems to be justified because of a greater danger of repercussions affecting
employment status than is presented by voluntary contributions. A superior could
much more easily learn who did and did not respond favorably to a solicitation,
which indeed he himself may have initiated, than he could discover who has
67
given voluntary, unsolicited contributions to a candidate of his choice.
b. Participationin party and campaign activities
The second general type of prohibition indicated above was that of active
participation in party and campaign activities. The forms taken by statutes and
rules imposing this general restriction are quite diverse. Most are more detailed
than section 12(a) of the Hatch Act which says little more than the label here
given to the general type of prohibition. However, in spite of the diversity, an
attempt at classification does reveal a few basic approaches to the problem at which
this kind of restriction is aimed. Again note that the classifications as drawn are
not mutually exclusive so that some states combine two or more of the various
available approaches.

65 MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-1439 (1947); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 70:2 IV
(Supp. 1963). The Montana provision could be construed as prohibiting solicitation of
contributions by employees also. However, the only prohibition directed specifically against
employees deals with contributions.
66 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.31(1) (b) (1960). This is the Florida provision which applies
to all state, county and municipal employees. For the other Florida provision, which applies
only to classified service employees, see supra note 58.
67 The Hawaii statute, HAwAn Rxv. LAws § 3-70(d) (1955), presents an interesting
way to allow voluntary contributions but at the same time to prevent them from being linked
to a particular candidate: "Any person in the civil service may make voluntary contributions
to a political organization for its general expenditures." (Emphasis added.)
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i. The most common prohibitions
By far the most common form .of prohibition of active participation in party
and campaign activities is the Alabama provision as follows:
No employee in the classified service shall be a member of any
national, state, or local committee of a political party, or an officer of

a partisan political club, or a candidate for nomination or election to any
public office, or shall take any part in the management or affairs of any
political party or in any political campaign, except to exercise 6 8his right
as a citizen privately to express his opinion and to -cast his vote.
It is evident that this provision prohibits specifically some of the activities which
have been found to be in violation of section 12(a) of the Hatch Act.69 This kind
of restriction, in either statutory or rule form, is found in eleven states.70 There
are a few variations in some of these states from the text quoted above. For example, this provision proscribes candidacy for "nomination or election to any
public office." 7 In three states an exception to this particular prohibition is made
by the addition of language to this effect: "This section does not prohibit appointment, nomination, or election to nonpartisan public office in a local government
72
unit.1

The Hatch Act recognizes a similar exception.7 3

Note also, in the quoted

provision, the reference to expression of opinion "privately." As has been indicated
this limitation of expression is not present, either expressly or by implication, in

section 12(a) of the Hatch Act.7 4 In eight states, not all of them having the

specific type of prohibition being discussed here, the word "private" remains. 75
Perhaps the same considerations which prompted Congress to remove this limitation
from the federal law will compel these states to do likewise if they have occasion
to reconsider their legislation.
The Alabama provision quoted above and those like it in other states, seems
by comparison with some of the other statutes to be considered, a rather effective
imposition of political restrictions, prescinding from the question of whether its
limitations go too far. It has the virtues of specificity and interpretability in view
of the body of analogous federal law available to its administrators.
ii. The shorter form
Moving on, five states have what seems to be an abbreviated Hatch-like ver68 ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 317 (1960); Rules of the State Personnel Bd., § 4(e) (rev.
1956).
69 See text accompanying note 36 supra.
70 ALA. CODE tit.
55, § 317 (1960) and Rules of the State Personnel Board, § 4(e)
(rev. 1956); ALASKA STAT. § 39.25.160(a) (1962); Conn., Regulations of the Civil Commission, State Personnel Dept., § 14-13 (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 110.13(4) (1960);
Ga. State Personnel Board Rules and Regulations, Rule 3, par. 3.104; Ky. Rnv. STAT. ANN.
§ 18.310(4) (1963); LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15 (N) (7) and La. Civ. Serv. Rules, Rule
14.1E (1963); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 36.150(5) (1949) and, Rules and Regs. Personnel Div.,
Rule 15.4(b); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 818 (1965); WASH. REV. CODE § 41.06.250(2)
(Supp. 1964); WEST VA. CODE § 2835(17)(e) (1961).
71 ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 317 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
72 ALASKA STAT. § 39.25.160(a) (Supp. 1962). The other two states are Kentucky
and Washington. (Emphasis added.)
73 However, the Hatch Act exception is considerably broader. Section 16 of the Act,
54 Stat. 767, as amended 5 U.S.C. § 118m (1958), authorizes the commission to remove
political activity restrictions for federal employees living in communities where the majority
of the voters are federal employees. Federal employees, who wish to run for public office
in such communities must, according to PAMPHLET 20, p.17, run as independents, not
associated with a political party. This corresponds with the "non-partisan" language in
the state legislation. PAMPHLET 20, p.17, lists the municipalities to which section 16 has
been applied. Most of them are in the Maryland and Virginia suburbs surrounding Washington.
74 40 OPs. ATT'Y GEN. 15 (1941). See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
75 ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 317 (1960); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 110.13(4) (1960); IoWA CODE
ANN. § 365.29 (1946); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18.310(4) (1963); LA. CONST. art. XIV,
§ 15(N)(7); Nebraska Merit System Rules, art. XVI; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 818
(1965); WEST. VA. CODE § 2835(17)(e) (1961).
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sion of the form of restriction discussed above, its essence being no active partici. •

pation in political activity.76 The Connecticut statute is illustrative:

No person employed in the classified service shall participate in 'any
manner in any political activity on behalf of'any political party or candidate
for election other than to cast his vote in any election and express his
opinion as a citizen with relation to any issue before the electorate. Any
person in the classified service shall be adequate
violation of this section
7 7 by a
reason for dismissal.

Such a statute seems to intend substantially the same restrictive effect as the more
detailed provision. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the Connecticut

Civil Service Rules expand upon the statute in using in part the language of the
longer provision.78 A noteworthy feature of the otherwise similar Iowa statute,
which may set it apart from the rest, is that its activity'prohibitions appear to be
directed only at campaign activities as opposed to political activity during noncampaign times, if indeed there is such a thing as non-campaign time in the life
of a political party.
iii.The enumerative approach

Another form of prohibition, somewhat akin to the two already discussed,
might be termed the "enumerative" approach. Such statutes, rather than stating
restrictions in general terms, enumerate the specific activities which are proscribed.
The Illinois statute is of this variety:
Any employee subject to this Act may be discharged in accordance
with the discharge procedures controlling his position for participation
during regular working hours in any of the following acts:
(a) Participating in the organization of any political meeting.
(b) Soliciting money from any person for any political purpose.
(c) Selling or distributing tickets for political meetings.
(d) Assisting at the polls in behalf of any party or party-designated
candidate on any election day.
(e) Using or threatening to use the influence or authority of his position to coerce or to persuade any person to follow any course of political
action.
(f) Initiating or circulating any petitions on behalf of a candidate
or in support of a political issue.
(g) Making contributions of money in behalf of any candidate for
office or of any public or political issue.
campaign literature or material in behalf of any
(h) 7Distributing
9
candidate.

Seven other states adopt this enumerative approach.80 Naturally some of the
enumerations are rather thorough and produce prohibitions which have substan76 CONN. GEN. STAT. Rxv. § 5-61 (1958); Idaho, S.B. No. 69, §
Idaho Legislature; IowA CODE ANN. § 365.29 (1946); Nebraska Merit
XVI; OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 143.41 (Page 1953).
77 CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 5-61 (1958).
78 Regs. of the Civ. Serv. Comm'n, State Personnel Dept. (1961).
not only adopt some of the language of the longer provision but in fact
tion of the activities which have been found to be violative of the Hatch

in

PAMPHLET

11(2), 1965 Sess.,
System Rules, art.
These regulations
seem like a recitaAct, as summarized

20.

79 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24Y24, § 38(t) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964). It is important to
note that the prohibitions of this section apply to "regular working hours," a proviso which
makes the restrictions much less stringent. This statute is cited here because it is a good
example of the enumerative approach. Statutes which impose restrictions only during working hours are discussed below. In view of the complex nature of the state legislation, under
discussion, there will necessarily be other instances where statutes will fit more than one
classification.
80 LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15(N)(7) and La. Civ. Serv. Rules, Rule 14.1E; Rules of
the Civ. Serv. Comm'n, State of Mich., § 7.1 (1964); MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 43.28 (1961);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-1440 (1947); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-42B (1953); ORE.
Rxv. STAT. § 240.705 (Supp. 1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.904 (Supp. 1964). Maine
prohibits employees from serving as delegates to state and county conventions, as of town and
city party committees, and from. circulating primary nomination papers. Letters From Mr.
Ober C. Vaughn, Director of Personnel, State of Maine, to NOTRE DAME LAWYER, Mar. 22,
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tially the same effect as the first type discussed. 8' Others are not so thorough and
impose very limited restrictions.8 2 Manifestly this type of prohibition will be
ineffective if the enumerated activities are very specific but at the same time the
enumeration is not thorough enough in its listing of various possible objectionable
activities.
The
activity.
with the
the New

iv. The incompatibility approach
"incompatibility" approach is yet another mode of restricting political
This kind of prohibition restricts those activities which are incompatible
proper performance of the employee's function as an employee. Consider
Jersey statute which provides:
No person holding a position in the classified service shall ...

during

the hours of duty engage in any political activity nor at any other time
participate in political activities or campaigns so as to impair his usefulness in the position in which he is employed.8s

Three states have enacted statutes similar to this one, 4 in that the prohibition
applies beyond working hours. Three otherss5 have statutes which prohibit activities only during working hours, apparently on the rationale that they are incompatible with the proper performance of employment duties.
The "incompatibility" approach seems to be a basically valid one although
it is open to the objection that the standard of conduct required may be rather
vague. The California approach 8 enables the authority closest to the affected
employee to determine from its specialized knowledge which activities are particularly undesirable. Such a system may have its advantages but also may produce great disparity of regulation and consequent confusion among employees in
the various state departments. There might also be some question as to the competence of department heads to designate activities which should properly be
restricted. As for those states whose prohibitions apply only to working hours,
such provisions would seem to be ineffective to reach all activities which should
be regulated.
1965, on file in office of NOTRE DAME LAWYER. It must be admitted that some of these
provisions were placed in this category for want of a better classification. Not all are truly
enumerative as the Illinois statute. Some "enumerate" only one or two specific activities.
However, because they prohibit specific activities, as opposed to more general restrictions,
they are placed here.
81 E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.904 (Supp. 1964). This statute recites the usual
prohibition of participation "in political management or in political campaigns" and then
enumerates specific activities which are proscribed -delegate
to a political convention,
member of a committee of a political party, officer of a political organization, interference
with counting of ballots by election officers.
82 E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 43.28 (1961). This provision prohibits, apart from solicitation and contribution of funds for political purposes, only service as a delegate or alternate to a political convention and compelling an employee to join a political organization
and to participate in political activity.
83 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 11:17-2 (1960) (Emphasis added).
84 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19251; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-4-52 (1956); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 16.30 (1957). The California provision is not directed specifically at political activities. It empowers the appointing authority in each state agency to designate the particular
activities which are deemed incompatible for employees of the particular agency. Some of
the agencies (e.g., the California Highway Patrol) have specified certain political activities
as incompatible. Letter From Mr. Kelvin D. Sharp, Acting Exec. Officer, California State
Personnel Board to NOTR, DAME LAWYER, Feb. 16, 1965, on file in office of NoTRE DAME
LAWYER.

85 COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26-6-31 (Supp. 1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 242, § 38t
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-42F (Supp. 1963) ("No employee...
shall engage in partisan political activity while on duty.") Note that New Mexico has broader
prohibitions also; see note 80 supra.
86 See note 84 supra. The fact that the appointing authority designates activities specifically prohibited does much to overcome the objection to the "incompatibility" approach
that the standard of conduct is too vague.
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v. Affirmative provisions
Several states take an affirmative approach to employee political activity,
expressly granting freedom to participate in certain activities which in other states
are sometimes proscribed. Hawaii is probably the most representative of these states.
Its statute reads as follows:
The foregoing prohibited activities shall not be deemed to preclude
the right of any person in the civil service to vote as he chooses and to
express his opinions on all political subjects and candidates, nor, to be
a member of any political party, organization or club. Any person in the
contributions to a political organization
civil service may make voluntary
87
for its general expenditures.
Massachusettsss and Florida S9 have more limited provisions of this type. A question with regard to such statutes is whether they by implication prohibit that which
they do not affirmatively allow.

vi. Prohibition of office holding
In several of the types of restrictions thus far considered, there were specific
or implied prohibitions of an employee holding public office. Seventeen states,
among them some of the states already discussed above, have separate and specific
restrictions either requiring that an employee resign if he wishes to run for office, 90
or simply prohibiting an employee from becoming a candidate for or from holding
such an office, thus in effect forcing resignation. 91
2. States utilizing a piecemeal approach
The substantive prohibitions of political activity viewed thus far have been
for the most part applicable to all employees of the state government or applicable
to all of the state government's civil service employees. As noted at the outset of
this section, a number of states have no such provisions of state-wide applicability.
9 2
Five of these states adopt instead what might be called a "piecemeal" approach.
87 HAwAII REv. LAws § 3-70(d) (1955). The "foregoing prohibited activities" referred
to in the statute are use of official authority or influence to interfere with an election or
coerce action by a person or party and solicitation of funds. These are obviously very limited
restrictions. Wyoming might be mentioned at this point of the discussion of affirmative
restrictions since its provisions are unique and do not really fit under other categories. The
Wyoming restriction, Rules and Regs. of State Personnel Comm'n, Rule XV, § 15-1 is as
follows: "Participation by employees in the State service in politics or political campaigns,
or freely expressing political opinions, will not be prohibited. .. ."
88 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 55, § 11 (1964) (affirmatively allows employees to be "members of political organizations or committees"). The only prohibitions of the statute are
concerned with solicitation of funds for political purposes.
89 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.31(1) Cc) (1960) (allowing employee to run for "any elective
office in this state"). The prohibitions here are quite similar to those of the Hawaii statute,
supra note 87. However, this is the Florida provision applying to all state, county and
municipal employees. The Florida statute, supra note 70, which applies to classified employees
has much broader restrictions.
90 ALASKA STAT. § 39.25.160(e) (Supp. 1962); Georgia State Personnel Board, Rules
and Regs., Rule 3, par. 3.105; IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-1341 (repl. vol. 1961); KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 75-2953 (1964); Rules of the Civ. Serv. Comm'n, State of Michigan, Rule
7.3 (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 43.28 (1961); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 36.150(5) (1949);
Wyoming, Rules and Regs. of the State Personnel (Comm'n, Rule XV, § 15-2 (employee must
take unpaid leave of absence upon seeking nomination for public office).
91 ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 317 (1960); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 110.13(4) (1960); LA. CONST.
art. XIV, § 15(N) (8); N.H. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 98.18 (repl. vol. 1964); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 5-4-42B (Supp. 1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 818 (1965); Oregon Civ. Serv. Rules,
131.005(3) ; WEST VA. CODE § 2835(17) (e) (1961). These statutes indicate rather clearly
that an employee may not hold office, with certain exceptions for nonpaid local positions.
Other statutes imply a prohibition against office holding and, of course, this implication
could arise under any statute which prohibits "active participation" in political activities
or campaigns.
92 Arizona, Delaware, Nevada, South Dakota and Utah. The specific provisions are not
cited at this point because they will be listed in detail in the course of discussion.
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Nevada presents a representative example of this approach. It prohibits certain
political activities by members and/or employees of the state police force, of the
Gaming Commission, of the Gaming Control Board, of the Industrial Commission
and of the Public Service Commission.93 These prohibitions (Nevada's) vary in
content but most seem to restrict only membership on a committee of a political
party or in a party delegation to a political convention.9 4 Arizona9 s and Delaware G
have provisions similar to Nevada's in that a number of state agencies are subject to the restrictions. South Dakota9r and Utah9s are concerned only with
activities of the state police force.
A number of states which have prohibitions of general applicability nevertheless have statutes applicable to single state agencies.9 9 In some states these individual provisions may be superfluous since they proscribe activities already prohibited by the general statute. In others, the agencies covered by the specific provisions may not be within the state classified service and hence the general provisions which apply to civil service employees do not reach them. In some cases
where there are overlapping provisions, it would seem that the specific provisions
are merely cases of legislative inadvertence or inertia since they -lo not appear
to be especially designed to meet a particular problem of the agency covered by
the restriction. 0 0
An examination of the specific restrictions of the states using the "piecemeal"
approach fails to reveal any general pattern as to content. Some are thorough,
patterned on general state prohibitions' 0' while others are very limited in scope.' 02
However, it is possible to make a more definite statement as to the agencies which
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NEv. REv.

STAT.

§§ 230.130(2)

(State Police), 463.025(2)

(Gaming Comm'n),

463.040 (Gaming Control Board), 616.185(5) (Industrial Comm'n), 618.150(4) (Dept.
of Industrial Safety), 703.040(4) (Public Service Comm'n) (Supp. 1963).
94 E.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 703.040(4) (Supp. 1963): "No commissioner shall be a
member of any political convention or a member of any committee of any political party."
95 Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4-111D (Supp. 1964) (Dept. of Liquor Licenses and Control); § 8-320B (1956) (officers and employees of state institutions for juveniles); § 17-213
(Supp. 1964) (Game and Fish Dept.); § 18-115 (Supp. 1964) (Highway Dept.); § 26-305
(1956) (civil defense organizations).
96 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 111(d) (Supp. 1964) (Highway Dept.); tit. 19, §
3101(b) (Supp. 1964) (Employment Security Comm'n); tit. 20, § 3117 (1953) (civil
defense organizations); tit. 31, § 110 (1953) (Dept. of Public Welfare).
97 S.D. CODE ch. 55.16B15(14) (Supp. 1960).
98 UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-11-21 (1953).
99 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 21.20 (1961) (State Auditing Dept.); § 229.38 (1960)
(employees in the vocational administration program); § 252.20 (1962) (civil defense organizations); § 440.44(4)(c) (Supp. 1964) (Industrial Comm'n employees); § 947.10
(1944) (employees of the Parole Comm'n). For the general Florida provisions, see notes
54, 56, 66, 70, 75 supra. Other states which have specific, in addition to general, provisions
are Connecticut, Minnesota, Ohio and Pennsylvania. There may be other states in this
category in which individual state agencies have imposed restrictions on their employees.
However, the rules of such agencies are not conveniently accessible.
100 Continuing with the Florida example, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 110.06 (1960) lists exemptions to the classified service and thus to the political prohibitions imposed on classified
employees. Section 110.06(2)(h) lists as one of the exemptions, employees in state penal
and correctional institutions. Thus a specific restriction upon employees in such institutions
is easily explained. They are not covered by the general restrictions upon classified employees. However, a civil defense organization does not seem to fall within any of the
exemptions to classification. Yet there are specific restrictions upon such an agency as indicated in note 99 supra. This does not necessarily show inadvertence on the part of the
legislature, although this would seem to be the case in some states. There may still be
need for specific restrictions if for some reason the agency's employees cannot be classified
or if some particular problem exists as to them.
101 E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-11-21 (1953).
102 E.g., S.D. CODE ch. 55.16B15(14) (Supp. 1960) (prohibits only use of political
influence to gain employment advancement).
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are the subjects of individual statutes. The most popular are the state police,
civil
103
defense agencies, industrial commissions and fish and game commnissions.
3. Delegation to political subdivisions
In five of the states which have no general state-wide prohibitions concerning
employee political activity, the state government has delegated to political subdivisions of varying sizes the power and in some cases the obligation to organize
local civil service systems. 0 4 This delegation, if it may be called that, typically
contains a direction that certain political prohibitions be imposed on the employees
so organized. The Maryland scheme is not atypical of this approach. Its murmci.palities which have the municipal corporation charter form of government, and
which create a merit system for their .employees, subject such employees to the
following restrictions:
. . . [N]o officer or employee in the classified service of the town shall
continue in such position after becoming a candidate for nomination or
election to any public office; . .. no person shall orally, by letter or otherwise, solicit or be in any manner concerned in soliciting any assessment,
subscription, or contribution for any political party or political purpose
whatever from any person holding a position in the classified service of
the town; no person holding a position in the classified service of the
town shall make any contribution to the campaign funds of any political
party or any candidate for public office or take any part in the management, affairs, or political campaign of any political party or candidate

for public office, further than in the exercise
of his right as a citizen to
express his opinion and to cast his vote.' 05
As is evident from a cursory reading, this statute, like those in the other states
which utilize this general approach, assumes the form of one of the general types
of state prohibitions which have been discussed above. 0 6 Four other states attack
the problem through municipal or county civil service systems.' 07 The employees
covered within such a system, however, may vary from state to state.
Again, some of the states with one form or another of general state-wide prohibitions have delegated to political subdivisions the power to create, or have
directly created for them, a classified service, the employees of which will be subject to certain political restrictions. In two of these states the coverage of the
prohibitions is very limited, applying only to city policemen and firemen. 0 8 In
the other four states in this category, the coverage is broader, encompassing most
employees in the affected municipalities. 00 The actual substance of the provisions
again usually takes the form of one of the general provisions discussed above."10
103 See agencies listed in notes 93-99 supra.
104 Arkansas, Maryland, Mississippi, North Dakota and South Carolina. The specific provisions will be cited as the discussion proceeds.
105 MD. CODE ANN. art. 23B, § 70(a) (1957).
106 The Maryland statute may be characterized as prohibiting both solicitation and
contribution of funds for political purposes, this type of restriction on the state-wide level
having been discussed in the text accompanying note 57 supra. The activities restriction
seems to be of the kind discussed in the text accompanying note 7 supra.
107 ARK. STAT. § 19-1312 (repl. vol. 1956) (employees in cities of over 75,000 pop.),
§ 19-1432 (Supp. 1963) (employees in cities of 20,000 to 75,000 pop.), § 19-1612 (repl.
vol. 1956) (policemen, firemen, and/or nonuniformed employees in cities of the first class);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 3825-13 (1942) (municipal civil service employees); N.D. CODE ANN.
§ 40-44-09 (1960) (municipal civil service employees-very thorough provision); S.C.
CODE § 47-699.139 (1962) (employees in municipalities with Council-Manager form of
government), § 47-762 (1962) (employees in cities of 28,000 to 29,000 pop.). ,
108 Tax. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 22 (1963); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-384, 15-407
(1957).
109 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3201-05; K-,. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.220(2) (1963); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 43, § 92(A) (1961); ORE. REV. STAT. § 241.515 (Supp. 1963).
110 E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90.220(2) (1963) (applicable to civil service employees
in cities of the first class):
No person in the classified service . . . shall directly or indirectly,

give, solicit, receive, or remit, any assessment, subscription, or contribu-
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As a final point with reference to those states which have both state-wide and local
prohibitions covering the same employees, a question could occur as to which
legislation would apply in case of conflict. In California, the Attorney General
has 11
ruled that the state legislation does not pre-empt non-conflicting local legislation. '
D. Issues Raised by the State Cases

The foregoing discussion of the legislation and regulation in the field of political activity has been rather detailed. However, this dissection of the material
was necessitated by the fact that there has been little judicial interpretation of
the statutes or rules alluded to.
There are a number of reasons for this lack of judicial treatment of the problem. For one thing, in some states there simply is no problem. Several states
report no violations of political activity prohibitions for quite some time."12 In
other states where there certainly are violations, any number of factors may account
for failure of disputes to reach the courts. An employee who is in violation of the
prohibitions may first be warned before any action is taken against him."x3 An
employee so warned will probably end participation in the objectionable activity
rather than lose his job-dismissal from the state service being the most common sanction for violation. 1 4 Thus, a large number of prospective cases are
eliminated before they start. Even if a bona fide violation occurs, remedial action
is most often taken by an administrative agency, empowered to dismiss the offender.
The agency is usually a civil service commission, or some similar body which
administers the civil service law in which the political activity restrictions are
found. Two formidable barriers stand in the way of these cases ever advancing
to a judicial determination. First, the whole question of judicial review of administrative decisions, with all of its vagaries, is interposed. A discussion of this
question would range far beyond the scope of this survey. Secondly, the validity
and procedures of political activity legislation are so well established that there
can be little fresh "grist for the judicial mills." However, by the very fact that
there has been little judicial action we may assume that the cases which have
been decided have dealt with significant issues. Otherwise they probably would
not have progressed as far as the courts.
At the outset of the discussion of the judicial materials, a few words with
reference to the constitutionality and purposes of the restrictions upon political
activity are in order. The initial discussion of the Hatch Act has touched on these
points but the state decisions may be profitably considered for the sake of comparison and for the few additional points which they raise.
Considering first the constitutional issue, it is evident from the earlier discussion of the Hatch Act that the principal difficulties of legislation of this kind are
its inherent restrictions upon freedom of speech and the rights of citizens to partion, to or for any political party or any candidate for public office, or
in any manner be concerned therewith; nor shall any such person be a
member of any campaign committee or governing committee of any political organization nor an officer in either; . . . provided, however, nothing
herein shall prevent any such person from freely expressing his or her
views as a citizen or to cast his or her vote in any election.
111 43 Op. ATT'v GEN. 236 (Cal. 1964).
112 E.g., Wisconsin reports that no case of employee political activity has been before
the Personnel Board or the courts for thirty years. Letter From C. K. Wettengel, Director,
Dept. of Administration, Bureau of Personnel, to NOTRE DAMFE LAWYER, Feb. 8, 1965, on
file in office of NOTRE DAME LAWYER.
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See, e.g., Attorney General's Opinion at 22 Pa. D.&C. Rpts.2d 549 (1960).

This

opinion discusses a number of employee political activity problems which occurred in Penn-

sylvania and notes that in a number of prospective cases the employee abandoned his objectionable activities when warned that such activities were in violation of the law.
114 See, e.g., 'Connecticut statute quoted in the text accompanying note 77 supra.
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ticipate in the democratic process of government. From an early date in the history
of political activity regulation on the state level, constitutional objections have
been swept aside by the rationale that the holding of a public position is not a
matter of right, but is a mere privilege. Thus, the government-employer has the
power to impose certain conditions of employment, among them restrictions upon
political activities. One of the earliest but yet most often cited judicial expressions
of the constitutional validity of this kind of legislation is the incisive statement of
Justice Holmes, then a member of the highest Court of Massachusetts, in McAuliffe
v. City of New Bedford." 5 The case involved a policeman who was dismissed
from the force for violation of a political activity ordinance.
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but
he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied terms
of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him."16
7

This Holmes opinion has been cited and followed in the later cases.1"
However, the right to impose such restrictions is not unlimited. Again the
older cases have defined the limits and their definitions have endured. The Supreme
Court of Vermont, in Brownell v. Russell, stated:
It is doubtless true that the restrictions imposed must be a reasonable
exercise of the power granted, and have some just relation to the end in
view. It seems to us that the provision in question satisfies these requirements.
We think the removal of the police force from the field of active politics is
calculated to promote the efficiency of the force and the purity of municipal government, and that the rule adopted imposes no greater restric-s
tion than is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of this purpose."I

What are the ends or purposes which the restrictions are reasonably designed
to accomplish? As with the federal cases, the state cases are quite uniform in
indicating that the principal purpose, as outlined in the quoted passage, is to prevent political allegiance, rather than efficiency, from becoming the criterion for
choice of public servants. Or, as the Florida Supreme Court stated in upholding
that state's prohibition against advising contributions from other employees, the
purpose of such legislation is ".. . to preserve the political purity of public employment and to protect public employees against harassment and political annoyances
as conditions to holding their jobs." 1 9 Perhaps the most thorough discussion on the
state level of the policy underlying political activity prohibitions is found in State
v. Kirby, 20 at issue there was the constitutionality of the political activity restrictions contained in an amendment to the charter of the City of St. Louis. The
Supreme Court of Missouri noted the distinction between elected officials, who,
as those responsible for implementing public policy, must be responsive to the
popular political will, and other public employees over whom there is no necessity
of popular control since they perform only ministerial functions.' 2' It reasoned that
efficiency is the measure of the worth of the latter class of employees"22 This
efficiency is seriously impaired when political affiliation becomes one of the factors
entering into the selection of public servants. 28 The reasonable method of pre115
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155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-18. Accord, Duffy v.Cooke, 239 Pa. 427, 86 At. 1076

(1913).

117 See, e.g., Ricks v. Dept. of State Civ. Serv., 200 La. 342, 8 So.2d 49 (1942); Stowe
v. Ryan, 135 Ore. 371, 296 Pac. 857 (1931). For a further discussion of the constitutionality
of state restrictions upon political activities, see KAPLAN, LAW OF CIVIL SERVICE 346-49.
118 76 Vt. 326, 57 At. 103, 104 (1904).
119 State v.Stuler, 122 So.2d 1,3 (Fla. 1960).
120 349 Mo. 988, 163 S.W.2d 990 (1942).
121 Id., 163 S.W.2d at 995.
122 Id., 163 S.W.2d at 996.
1213 Ibid.
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venting undesirable political effects, and one which is not beyond the legislative
2
discretion, is to prohibit public employees from taking an active part in politics.

4

Thus do the arguments run on the constitutional and rational justification
for political activity legislation. These arguments are quite simple. It is submitted that perhaps they are too facile. It seems that the early decisions on the
subject, on both the state and national levels, have been followed without question
or periodic re-evaluation. For example, in State ex rel. Duren v. Patterson,125
the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in speaking of that state's statute requiring
resignation of an employee upon filing as a candidate for office, commented that:
"The constitutionality of the statute is not questioned. It could not very well be
in view of United Public Workers v. Mitchell ....,,126 Such a statement typifies
the unwillingness of the courts to re-examine the validity of political restrictions.
The United Public Workers decision was an extremely close one. Moreover, it
dealt with a specific statute. Certainly such a decision should not foreclose all
further discussion of the validity of political activity restrictions, especially in cases
where a different statute with perhaps radically different provisions is presented
for consideration. This is not to say that the decisions and basic philosophy of
political restrictions are erroneous. However, it is to say that perhaps a little more
care should be taken in approving restrictions of constitutional rights than mere
reference to a time-worn formula. Some decisions seem to uphold the general
principle of regulation without examining the possible effects of the specific provisions in the statutes under consideration. The apparent exception to this statement is the one case in which a statute restricting political activity was held
unconstitutional, Fort v. Civ. Serv. Comm'n of Cty. of Alameda 27 In that case,
the Supreme Court of California, without dissent, refused to follow the time
honored formulas for upholding political activity legislation. Rather it examined
the specific provisions of the ordinance in question and determined that the legislative body had gone too far in imposing certain prohibitions-specifically restrictions
upon participation in activities concerned with referendum measures -on
the
ground that the proscribed activities were non-partisan in nature.
As was indicated during the discussion of the legislative materials, it is possible that some of the restrictions go further than is necessary. More care might
also be taken particularly on the legislative level where, as is apparent from the
haphazard and ill-considered scheme of restrictions in some states, the full weight
1 28
of legislative know-how has not been brought to bear on the problem.

Putting aside policy and constitutional considerations, what do the state
cases reveal in terms of substantive interpretation of this mass of legislation?
Actually they do not reveal very much. There are few cases and they must be
read in the light of the statutes with which they are concerned. Perhaps the
statutes in most states are well understood and only novel and controversial points
require judicial determination. At any rate, the cases may be taken for what they
are worth-answers to a specific problem with possible implications of a wider
nature.
A few of the cases emphasize that participation in political affairs, to be
objectionable, must be active. In Gibbs v. Orlandi,129 the Supreme Court of
124

Ibid.

125 234 Minn. 432, 48 N.W.2d 574 (1951).
126 Id., 48 N.W.2d at 576.
127 38 Cal. Rptr. 625, 392 P.2d 385 (1964), noted in 10 ViLL. L. Rv. 152 (1964),
discussed in the text accompanying note 132 infra.
128 The exception in some of the legislation which has been examined *allowing participation in local non-partisan activities, supra note 72, seems to be one example of a legislative determination that sensible limitations designed to fit the circumstances in lieu of
"blanket" restrictions are possible. Yet, broad prohibitions covering large groups of employees
seem to be the rule.
129 27 Ill. 2d 368, 189 N.E.2d 233 (1963).
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Illinois affirmed a lower court decision that a mine rescue supervisor,3 0 dismissed
for distributing campaign literature in violation of the Illinois statute,1 be reinstated with back pay. The supervisor had allowed certain campaign literature
to remain on a desk in his office in plain sight of the employees who entered
therein. However, there was no evidence that he had passed any of the literaoffenses under the statute "clearly
ture out. The Court stated that all of the
"
denote positive affirmative political acts."113
The state decisions do not make the point as plainly as do the federal cases
that partisanship is one of the necessary elements for finding activity unlawful.
However, the state statutes, by their continual reference to parties, would seem
to make it clear that partisanship is contemplated as an indispensable element in
32
any violation. In fact, in Fort v. Civil Service Commission of County of Alameda,
the one instance where political activity restrictions were found to overstep constitutional bounds, one of the principal grounds for decision seems to have been
that the statute went beyond partisan activities and was "not limited to conduct
regarding partisan offices and issues but relates equally to3 all candidates and questions, whether or not identified with a political party."'13 An interesting question
34
concerning partisanship arose in Gremillion v. Department of Highways' - is
it necessary for an employee to be an organized worker for his activities, to be
deemed partisan? The situation was that a state highway foreman had been
dismissed for urging his subordinates to vote for a particular candidate. Dismissal
of the foreman was upheld, despite the fact that he was not an organized worker,
on the rationale that the evil which the activity prohibition seeks to eliminate is
no less evil or present because the offender is not affiliated with a party organization.13 5 Thus, if one actively supports a candidate, he is partisan.
The use of partisanship as one of the criteria for determining violations may
prove unsatisfactory when an issue, e.g., bond approval, rather than a candidate
is the object of political activity. Should active advocacy of one side of an issue
be prohibited if no political party is involved? This question has given some difficulty in Ohio. In the case of State ex rel Green v. City of Cleveland, 38 it was
held that campaigning in behalf of an issue was participation in political activity
within the meaning of the city charter. 37 Fifteen years later, in Heidtman v. City
of Shaker Heights,38 it was held that firemen who were circulating an initiative
petition seeking a city ordinance to establish a three-platoon system in the fire
department, were not participating in politics within the meaning of the Ohio
statute because the word "politics" had to be taken "in its narrower partisan
sense. . . .""' The Green case had been distinguished by the court below on a
number of grounds, including the language of respective prohibitions and the fact
that the statute in Heidtman was penal in nature and therefore had to be strictly
construed. 140 Neither decision made clear that political party involvement was a
crucial consideration although this seems a reasonable inference from the language
of the later case. Perhaps the same dangers to the public service are present whether
130 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24V2, § 38(t) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964), quoted in text accompanying note 79 supra.
2d 368, 189 N.E.2d 233, 235 (1963). See Rosenfelder v. Huttoe, 24 So. 2d 108
131 27 Ill.
(Fla. 1945).
132 38 Cal. Rptr. 625, 392 P.2d 385 (1964).
133 Id., 392 P.2d at 388.
134 129 So. 2d 805 (La. 1961).
135 Id. at 808.
136 33 Ohio L. Abs. 72, 33 N.E.2d 35 (Ct. of Apps. Cuyahoga Oty. 1940).
137 Id., 33 N.E.2d at 38-39. See Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 281 Mass. 253, 183 N.E.
495 (1932).
138 163 Ohio St. 109, 126 N.E.2d 138 (1955).
139 Id., 126 N.E.2d at 143.
140- 99 Ohio App. 415, 119 N.E.2d 644, 648-49 (1954). The Green and Heidtman cases
are discussed in KAPLAN, op. cit. supra note 117 at 347-50.
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However in no case would the
or not political parties take sides on an issue.
dangers appear to be so great as to justify a blanket prohibition of participation in
all advocacy of issues before the electorate.
A final point of some interest considered in the state decisions concerns the
42
In State
provisions requiring an employee to resign before running for office.1
ex rel Duren v. Patterson,43 an employee decided to run for office and handed
in his resignation to take effect after election day. Then, apparently because political prospects were not too rosy, he attempted to withdraw the resignation and
return to state employment; this after he had conducted certain campaign activities. It was held in essence that to permit such activities would obviously subvert
the purposes of the statute. 44
The foregoing summary of the state cases serves as a convenient point of
departure from the discussion of the restrictions on the political activities of state
employees. The cases re-emphasize the salient points of the preceding sections
purpose of political activity legislation, its constitutionality and the key con-the
cepts of active participation and partisanship. The cases also indicate, in conjunction with some of the seemingly ill-considered legislation, a need for a real reappraisal of this entire field of regulation with the purpose of better adapting the
legislative restrictions to the actual dangers to the integrity of public employment
which are presented by employee participation in political affairs.

III.

To ORGANIZE, BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY
To STmKE
A. Introduction
This portion of the Survey will be directed to the law of labor relations in the
public service. The problems arising in giving to public employees the rights to
organize, to bargain collectively and to strike will be analyzed. Upon conclusion
we shall examine arbitration and mediation as possible alternatives to the public
employee strike.
Justice Hughes, speaking for the Supreme Court in the celebrated case of
NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., made the assertion that:
"... [T]he right of employees to self-organization and to select representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining or other mutual protection without restraint or coercion by their employer . . . is a fundamental right.... [A] single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer. . . [Union was essential
145 to give laborers opportunity to deal on
an equality with their employer.
Although Justice Hughes called these rights fundamental, public employees have
been denied them at all levels of government. The federal labor relations acts
specifically exclude public employees from their provisions. 4 State labor relations
acts similarly exclude those engaged in public employment. 147 Statutes which do not
specifically exclude public employees have been interpreted so as to deny them the
THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
AND

141 The Legislature of the State of Washington apparently thinks not. The recently enacted Washington statute, WASH. REv. CODE § 41.06. 250(2) (Supp. 1964), specifically
permits full participation in "campaigns relating to constitutional amendments, referendums,
initiatives, and issues of a similar character, and for non-partisan offices."
142 Such provisions have been discussed in the text accompanying notes 90-91 supra.
143 234 Minn. 432, 48 N.W.2d 574 (1951).
144 Id., 48 N.W.2d at 576. See 1954 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 220 (Indiana 1954).
145 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937). (Emphasis added.)
146 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2): "The term 'employer' . . . shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation . . .or any State or
political subdivision thereof. ..."
147 See, e.g., the labor relations act of New York, N.Y. LAB. LAWS § 715: "The provisions of this article shall not apply to . . .employees of the state or of any political or civil
subdivision or other agency thereof...." See also Minnesota's anti-injunction act, MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 185.19 (1947).
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right to engage in collective activity.148 Even President Roosevelt, who was an early
backer of organized labor, said that it was impossible to give to public employees the
rights afforded employees in private business. 149 Because of these express exclusions
of public employment by statutes, judicial interpretation and executive policy, the
public labor relations law has been slow to develop.
Many states have not passed legislation in the area of public employment at
all,150 whereas others have only fragmentary provisions,151 similarly the case law
is relatively sparse. Legal commentary, however, which only a few years ago was
almost non-existent in this area, is growing apace.1 52 This perhaps reflects a recognition of the problems created by the startling absence of law and the increased
demand by public employee unions for better wages and conditions.
It is recognized that there is a trend in the law of public employer-employee
relations. More employees and more unions are receiving rights of collective
activity. 53 It is the confusion about the form and extent of this trend that we
shall attempt to clarify.
The confusion in the ,law of public employer-employee relations exists on the
state and local levels. The federal law, as comprehensively defined by regulation
148 E.g., City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947) which held
that Mo. CONST. art. I, § 29, giving to employees the right to unionize, does not apply to
public employees. But see Potts v. Hay, 229 Ark. 830, 318 S.W.2d 826 (1958), which held
a similar Arkansas provision applicable to public employees.
149 Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to President of National Federation of Federal
Employees, Aug. 16, 1937: "The very nature and purposes of government make it impossible
for administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in mutual discussions
with government employee organizations. The Employer is the whole people, who speak by
means of laws enacted by their representatives in Congress. Accordingly, administrative employees and officials alike are governed and guided, and in many instances restricted, by
laws which establish policies, procedures, or rules in personnel matters." As quoted in CIO
v. City of Dallas, 198 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
150 Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, West
Virginia, Wyoming.
151 E.g., IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2401-2415 (1952); ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 127, § 63b109(7)
(Supp. 1964), ch. 24, §§ 10-3-8--11 (1962). But see MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.51-.60
(Supp. 1964) which provides for a complete Public Employee Labor Relations Act.
152 Of eighteen articles examined on this area, fifteen were published since 1960.
See generally, Anderson, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 601,

12 LA . L.J. 1069 (1961); Brinker, Recent Trends of Labor Unions in Government, 12 LAB.
L.J. 13 (1961); Seitz, Rights of School Teachers to Engage in Labor OrganizationalActivities,
44 MARQ. L. REv. 36 (1960); Seligson, A New Look at Employee Relations in Public and
Private Service, 15 LAn. L.J. 287 (1964); Strayhorn, Municipal Employees and the Law,
1961 U. ILL. L.F. 377; Vogel, What About the Rights of the Public Employee?, 1 LAB. L.J.
604 (1950); Note, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 75 HAav. L. Rav. 391 (1961).
In the area of collective bargaining see, Cornell, Collective Bargaining by Public Employee
Groups, 107 U. PA. L. Ray. 43 (1958); Grady, Collective Bargaining and Public Employees,
9 Bos. B.J. 9 (1965); Wollet, The Public Employee at the Bargaining Table: Promise or

Illusion?, 15 LAB. L.J. 8 (1964).
In the area of mediation and arbitration see, Chisholm, Mediating the Public Employee
Dispute, 12 LAB. L.J. 56 (1961); Killingsworth, Grievance Adjudication in Public Employment, 13 Ann. J. 3 (1958); Krislov and Schmulorvitz, Grievance Arbitration in State and

Local Government Units, 18 Ann. J. 171 (1963); Moskowitz, Mediation of Public Employee
Disputes, 12 LAB. L.J. 54 (1961); Parker, The Role of the Michigan Labor Mediation Board
in Public Employee Labor Disputes, 10 LAB. L.J. 632 (1959).

In the area of the recent Executive Order 10988, issued by President Kennedy (see
footnote 156, infra), and federal employee relations see, Barr, Executive Order 10988: An

Experiment in Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service, 52 Gao. L.J. 420
(1964); Hart, Government Labor's New Frontiers Through Presidential Directive, 48 VA. L.
REV. 898 (1962); Wortman, Labor Relations in Government Services, 15 LAn. L.J. 482 (1964).
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has grown apace in recent years." Wollet, The Public Employee at the Bargaining Table:
Pronmise or Illusion?, 15 LAB. L.J. 8 (1964). See also Brinker, Recent Trends of Labor Unions
in Government, 12 LAn. L.J. 13 (1961); Cornell, Collective Bargaining by Public Employee
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and statute, is however fairly well settled. Thus, in this Survey the federal law
will be considered only as a preface to an analysis which will give special emphasis
to the problems arising in state law.
B. The Federal Law of Public Labor Relations
Prior to 1962, the only federal law pertaining to public employees was the
Lloyd-LaFollette Act.15 4 It provides that membership in a union does not constitute cause for discharge so long as such union does not assert the right to strike.
This provision, however, was not directed to the entire federal service, but only to
postal employees.
Then in June, 1961, President Kennedy appointed a task force to study and5
make recommendations on employee-management relations in the public service."
The task force held hearings throughout the country and made a study from which
it composed a report. This report was submitted to the President in November,
1961.156 It expressed that an orderly and constructive employee-management relationship was necessary for the efficient administration of government. To fulfill
these needs, it recommended that a clear statement of the respective rights and
obligations of employee organizations and agencies be set forth.
The report concluded that a greater participation by employees in the determination and implementation of employment policies and procedures would lead to a
more effective public service.
Pursuant to this report, President Kennedy implemented the recommendations
by issuing Executive Order 10988, January 17, 1962.1" This order provided for
the exclusive, formal or informal recognition of employee organizations. It also
provided for the preparation of a code of fair practices and standards of conduct.
Under Executive Order 10988, exclusive recognition may be granted by an
agency to an employee organization which represents a majority of an appropriate
unit." 8 The representative of this organization may negotiate agreements for the
entire unit, which it shall represent non-discriminately. These agreements may
relate to grievances, personnel policies and practices, and general working conditions. The obligation of the agency to negotiate, however, shall not be construed
to extend "to such areas of discretion and policy as the mission of an agency, its
budget, its organization and the assignment of its personnel, or the technology of
performing its work." 159
Where no organization has qualified as the exclusive representative of the
appropriate unit, the agency may grant formal recognition to any organization
which represents at least ten per cent of the employees in the unit.

60

Formal

recognition pemits the union to present its views as to matters of personnel policies
and practices and general working conditions which affect the members of its
organization. It is given no right to represent those outside of its membership. In
no case of formal recognition is the agency bound to confer on matters about which
it would not be bound to negotiate with organizations exclusively recognized.
Regardless of whether any other organization in a unit is exclusively or

154 37 Stat. 555 (1912), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 652 (1958).
155 Appointment of President's Task Force on Employee-Management Relations in the
Federal Service, 26 Fed. Reg. 8225 (1961). Appointed as members of the Task Force were:
Arthur Goldberg, then Sec. of Labor, as Chairman; Chairman of the Civil Service Comm'n,
as Vice-Chairman; Director of the Bureau of the Budget; Sec. of Defense; and Postmaster
General.
156 The Task Force held hearings in Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, New York, San
Francisco, and Washington. It reported to the President on November 30, 1961.
157 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962).
158 § 6 at 553.
159 Id. § 6 at 554.
160 Id., § 5 at 553.
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formally recognized, any group may be granted informal recognition. 161 An employee organization so recognized may present to the agency any matters which
concern its members. However, the agency is not bound to consult with informally
recognized organizations.
Appropriate units which organizations may represent are determined by the
agency. Should the union seeking exclusive recognition challenge this unit such
that the dispute cannot be settled, the matter is submitted to arbitration for determination. 6 2
Executive Order 10988 also prescribes the preparation of a code of fair practices and standards of conduct.163 This was to be accomplished through the joint
efforts of the Department of Labor and the Civil Service Commission. After
studying and adopting ideas from the federal .labor relations acts and the 1956-57
Codes of Ethical Practices adopted by the AFL-CIO, 64 the Department of Labor
and the Civil Service Commission formulated- the Standards of Conduct for Em-5
ployee Organizations,and the Code of FairLabor Practicesin the FederalService.
It was intended that the Standards of Conduct and the Code of Fair Practices be
simpler to administer than its counterpart in private business, thus eliminating the
necessity of creating a separate agency or board. Upon analysis, though, it becomes
apparent that its simplicity is deceptive. It would seem that many of the problems
in interpreting the unfair labor practices of the Taft-Hartley Act, will analogously
arise in the administration of the Standards of Conduct and the Code of Fair
Practices.
The Standards of Conduct impose restrictive conduct only on the internal
organization and government of the employee unions. Failure to abide by these
standards as prescribed may result ultimately in the loss of agency recognition. The
Standards of Conduct require that a union operate in a democratic manner, that
officers who are affiliated with communist or totalitarian movements be excluded,
that officers not be permitted financial interests which conflict with the duty they
owe the union, and that fiscal integrity be maintained through prescribed forms
of accounting and reporting. 6c
The Code of Fair Practices prescribes certain unfair labor practices for both
agency management and employee organizations. For agency management, it is
an unfair labor practice to interfere with the rights of employees granted by Executive Order 10988, to discriminate in the hiring or retaining of employees, to dominate union activity, to discipline an employee because he testifies or files a complaint pursuant to the Standards of Conduct or the Code of Fair Practices, to
refuse appropriate recognition of unions or organizations, or to refuse to negotiate
when required to do so by Executive Order 10988.167 For unions, on the other
hand, it is an unfair labor practice to interfere with the -rights granted employees
under Executive Order 10988 or to induce management to do so, to discipline
jobs, to slow down or to
members performing duties which are demanded by their 68
strike, or to discriminate in granting union membership.
These unfair labor practices as provided by the Code of FairPracticesresemble
the unfair labor practices which govern the employee-employer relationship -in
private business. There is, however, an additional practice which patently sets the
Code of FairPracticesapart from the Taft-Hartley Act. The Code of Fair-Practices
161

Id., § 4 at 552.

162 Id., § 11 at 555.
163 Id., § 13 at 555.

164 Explanation of Provisions of the Standards of Conduct For Employee Organizationsand
Code of Fair Labor Practices in Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service,
Attachment to Federal Personnel Manual Letter 711-2, Aug. 30, 1963.

165 28 Fed. Reg. 5127 (1963).
166
167
168

Id., §§ 2.2(a)-(d) at 5128.
Id., § 3.2(a) at 5130.
Id., § 3.2(b) at 5130.
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makes it an unfair labor practice to strike, slow down or carry on any activity which
would have the result of a strike, slowdown or work stoppage. 169 There is also a
federal statute which makes it a felony to strike or assert the right to strike against
the federal government while in the federal service.1 70 It is clear that these provisions deprive the unions of their most powerful weapon.
Thus, employees in the federal service, under Executive Order 10988 and the
Standards of Conduct and the Code of Fair Practicesissued pursuant thereto, may
organize, gain exclusive recognition, and bargain collectively. In no case, however,
is a strike, work stoppage or slowdown tolerated.
C. The Concept of Publicness
It is necessary that the concept of publicness be analyzed to show why public
and private employees are treated differently in labor relations. Therefore this
discussion is intended as a prerequisite to the subsequent discussions on the rights
of organizing, collective bargaining and striking.
Employees in private industry have been enjoying rights of collective activity
for thirty years. Public employees, however, are still seeking these elementary
rights. This discrimination' 71 of guaranteeing to private employees the rights to
organize, to bargain collectively and to strike, while not granting these rights to
public employees must derive from the basic notion of publicness. Certain characteristics of publicness can be defined which support the general exclusion of public
employees from private enterprise labor relations acts. The courts recognize differing characteristics in their decisions. This inconsistency makes it difficult to point
to any one reason why public employees have been denied certain rights.
Perhaps the most fundamental characteristic of publicness is that of sovereignty.
The government is bestowed with sovereignty which is inherent in the people to
accomplish matters which cannot be accomplished by individuals. Thus it serves
as a practical device by which the will of the people is carried out by representatives. It is this notion of government which has most bedeviled efforts of unioniza72
tion. The court in CIO v. City of Dallas1
reasoned that to give to a few agents
or employees of government the rights of collective activity would be to transfer
to them all governmental power. The Connecticut Supreme Court in Norwalk
Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Education'7 1 supported this contention. It said that
the sovereignty is delegated to government to be exercised by its agents who "occupy
a status entirely different from those who carry on a private enterprise. They serve
the public welfare and not a private purpose. To say that they can strike is the
equivalent of saying that they can deny the authority of government and contravene
the public welfare."' 74 A lower Ohio court went so far as to consider that any
collective activity, which was directed at exacting from government that which
the people have not acquiesced in giving, was "a rebellion against government,"
a "means of destroying government."'175 From this notion of governmental soy169

Id., § 3.2(b)(4) at 5130.

170 5 U.S.C. § 118 p (1958): "No person shall accept or hold office or employment in
the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, including wholly owned Government corporations, who - . . . . (3) participates in any strike or asserts the right to
strike against the Government of the United States or such agency; or (4) is a member of an
organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government
of the United States or such agencies, knowing that such organization asserts such right."
5 U.S.C. § 118r (1958): "Any person who violates section 118p of this title shall be
guilty of a felony, and shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one
year and a day, or both."
171 See notes 146-149 supra.
172 198 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
173 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951).
174 Id., 83 A.2d at 485.
175 City of Cleveland v. Division 268 of Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 57
Ohio L. Abs. 173, 90 N.E.2d 711, 715 (C.P. 1949).
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ereignty, flows the policy that a few agents of government should not be able to
impede its operations.
Closely related to the notion of respecting sovereignty as derived from the
people is the characteristic of publicness based on the purposes for which sovereignty
was granted. One of the accepted purposes of government is to provide for the
safety and welfare of the community. The accomplishment of this must remain
unimpeded. For this reason, the court in Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs7 6
sustained a rule forbidding the unionization of policemen. In New York City Transit Authority v. Loos,1 7 7 the Court felt that the public interest and welfare demanded
that the rapid transit lines remain uninterrupted by union activity. Since the
people authorized a public corporation to manage transportation in New York
City, the union of relatively few members should not be permitted to frustrate this
purpose.
The manner of carrying out the purposes of government raise yet another
policy consideration incidental to publicness. Government operates for all the
people and not for itself. It therefore has no profit motive. Its operations must
be carried out as efficiently and economically as possible. This was recognized in
the Norwalk case where the Court pointed out that certain types of collective
178
activity would impede the economic and efficient operation of government.
Whether it is with the nature of sovereignty, or its purposes, or the manner
of accomplishing these purposes that we deal, in each case these considerations
dictate that publicness be treated differently from that of privateness.
Closely related to the discussion of the concept of publicness, which concept
has supported the denial of rights to public employees, is the discussion of the
governmental-proprietary distinction which has been suggested in support of the
granting of rights to public employees. "Governmental" and "proprietary" are
terms given different functions of government. The particular term given any
function depends on the degree to which the function resembles purely governmental operations or private operations. The more like a private operation a
function of government becomes, the more probable it is that this function will
be characterized as proprietary and the more likely it is that employees working in
that function will be given rights guaranteed private employees. 7 9
Two serious problems arise in connection with this distinction. First, what is
it that will determine exactly whether a function is governmental or proprietary?
Secondly, do courts generally recognize the dichotomy, or is it that the basic notion
of publicness cannot be overcome by reasoning that because the public employee
works in a function which is similar to functions carried on by private employees,
he is to be afforded rights of private employees? We shall take these up in order.
The basic notion of what is governmental and what is proprietary becomes
176 78 Cal. App.2d 638, 178 P.2d 537 (1947).
177 2 Misc. 733, 154 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1956), affirmed, 161 N.Y.S.2d 564 (App. Div.
1957).
178
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LAB. L.J. 287, 294 (1964): "The more similar a government activity is to that of a private

economy, in which workers normally organize, the more often it will be found that the government workers are also organized and that relations with management officals approach
the pattern of such relations in private."
Reasons given for this phenomenon were that most of the workers in such an organization
had previously worked for private employers; or, that the operation of the agency was similar
to an operation often performed by private business; or, that the agencies involved were
often more autonomous bodies with greater discretion in employee relations than is customary
in other government agencies. See also, Hamler v. City of Jacksonville, 97 Fla. 807, 122
So. 220, 221 (1929), where the court stated that because the city was acting in a proprietary
capacity, it is "governed by the same laws and may exercise the same rights of a private
corporation engaged in a similar undertaking."
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a facsimile of what is public and what is private. Hence an absence of incidents
of publicness may tend to support the proprietary classification. More generally
stated, those functions which, in the normal situation, are accomplished by private
corporations are functions which we call proprietary. Those functions which cannot be, or normally are not, accomplished by private corporations are governmental.
Thus the function of a municipality engaged in installing electric wiring in private
homes was held in Hamler v. City of Jacksonville80 to be proprietary, for that
function is normally accomplished by private corporations. The Florida Supreme
Court in Hamler said: ".

.

. [w]e must recognize that it is a well-established rule

that municipalities have two classes of power, one of which is the legislative, governmental, or public power, and the other is proprietary and quasi private; that
is, corporate power."' 81
The Supreme Court of Washington in Christie v. Port of Olympia12 made a
similar comparison to private industry. There, the function of longshoremen who
were unloading a vessel for the Port Authority was considered proprietary. The
Court easily distinguished this operation from a fireman who works in a governmental function.' 8s
The Arizona Supreme Court in Local 266, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Salt
8
River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power Dist."
held that a public
function was proprietary where it possessed characteristics of private corporations.

The state created Power District was operated for profit and it was privately owned.
Its function did not extend to the entire public, but only to a select area. Thus
the Court reasoned that the Power District's close similarity to private business
supported its classification as proprietary.
A distinction between governmental and proprietary has also been supported
on the basis of vitalness to the community. Thus in the New York City Transit
Authority s5s case, the court classified the Transit Authority as a governmental
function, because its cessation would cause disastrous results to the community.
New York is vitally dependent on rapid transit. Even though the operation is
one often accomplished by private corporations, its very vital nature was held to
make it governmental.
One of the most popular notions of what is governmental and what is proprietary turns on the delegability of functions. 86 The court in Weakley County
Municipal Elec. System v. Vicks" reasoned that a proprietary function is a delegation to an arm of government to accomplish some purpose in a manner similar
to that of private business. However, the discretion and authority of a governmental function may not be delegated. Support for this distinction is reflected in
Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.88 There, the court stated:
"The city has no right under the law to delegate its governing power to any agency.
180 97 Fla. 807, 122 So. 220 (1929).
181 Id., 122 So. at 221.
182 27 Wash.2d 534, 179 P.2d 294 (1947).
183 Id., 179 P.2d at 301.
184 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954).
185 2 Misc. 733, 154 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup.Ct. 1956), affirmed, 161 N.Y.S.2d 564 (App.
Div. 1957).
186 The court in CIO v. City of Dallas, 198 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Tex.Civ.App. 1946),
made the classic statement of policy based on public safety and delegability: "Nothing is
more dangerous to public welfare than to admit that hired servants of the state can dictate
to the Government the hours, the wages and conditions under which they will carry on essential services vital to the welfare, safety and security of the citizen. To admit as true that
Government employees have power to halt or check the functions of Government, unless
their demands are satisfied, is to transfer to them all legislative, executive and judicial power.
Nothing would be more ridiculous ....
Government is formed for the benefit of all persons,
and the duty of all to support it is equally clear. . . . [U]nless the people surrender some
of their natural rights to the Government it cannot operate."
187 43 Tenn. App. 513, 309 S.W.2d 792 (1957).
188 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945).
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To delegate such power to an independent agency would be a serious violation
of the law."'180 This manner of distinguishing proprietary and governmental is
closely related to the concept of sovereignty as an incident of publicness. In truth
the governmental-proprietary distinction is but a distinction between public and
private incidents of any one function of government.
Though the governmental-proprietary distinction is often discussed, it is not
which are afforded
often applied so as to give to public employees those rights
0
and Christie'0 ' cases
private employees. However, the Salt River Power District'9
do give collective rights to employees because of the proprietary function in which
the employees were engaged.
Other cases discuss the distinction, but then hold that the matter before them
is governmental in nature, thus eliminating the necessity of applying the distinction.19 Two cases held that the very functions at issue might be operated in a
proprietary manner, but since there93 was no statute recognizing the difference, the
...

function had to be governmental.

Many courts are now rejecting the dichotomy. In Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's Union, the Court rejected the governmental-proprietary
distinction by stating:
"... [T]he influence of the above-mentioned shadowy and ill-defined legal
terms or judicial concepts is waning. . . . [T]here is unquestionably no
logical basis for the application of those terms (governmental and prowe are concerned
prietary) in the particular area of the law with which
in the case at bar. (strikes in public employment)194

The court in the New York City Transit Authority case asserted that the distinction was outworn, having been developed for tortious actions brought against a
city to prevent it from escaping liability on the grounds of governmental immunity.195 Both City of Springfield v. Clouse and the Weakley'9 8 cases rejected it, not
grounds, but because the distinction had not been recognized by
on substantive
07
statute.
189 Id., 44 A.2d at 747.
190 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954). Actually, it seems strange that the Arizona court's
jurisdiction was not pre-empted by the federal labor relations law. The Supreme Court
in Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S.
383 ( 1951), held that a Wisconsin statute forbidding strikes in Public Utilities which were
privately owned was invalid because it interfered with the field occupied by federal law,
i.e. the Taft-Hartley Act. Privately owned public utilities, even if entirely with a state and
carrying on entirely intrastate activity, were held to be subject to the Taft-Hartley Act in
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938). In the Arizona: case, the District,
called a political subdivision, was a privately owned operation for profit. Similarly in Consolidated Edison and Wisconsin Board cases the public utilities were privately owned, but in
these the NLRB had jurisdiction of the labor dispute. In Dade County v. Amalgamated Ass'n
of Street Employees, 157 So. 2d 176 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1963), appeal dismissed mem., 166 So.
2d 149 (Fla. 1964), solicitor gen. invited to file briefs for U.S., 85 Sup.Ct. 185 (1964), cert.
denied, 85 Sup. Ct. 642 (1965), the union filed with the NLRB, but the Board declined
jurisdiction. The transit authority there was a public utility, partially controlled by private
money. The line of demarcation must lie somewhere between the entirely privately owned
utility in the Wisconsin Board case and the hybrid ownership arrangement in the Dade
County case.
191 27 Wash.2d 534, 179 P.2d 294 (1947).
192 E.g., Mugford v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945).
193 City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947); Weakley County
Municipal Electric System v. Vick, 43 Tenn. App. 513, 309 S.W.2d 792 (1957).
194 52 Wash.2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099, 1101 (1958).
195 2 Misc. 733, 154 N.Y.S.2d 209, 215 (Sup.Ct. 1956), affirmed, 161 N.Y.S.2d 564
(App.Div. 1957). See also, City of Los-Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & City Trade Council
94 Cal. App.2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (1949).
196 Cases cited note 193 supra.
197 But see State v. Julian, 359 Mo. 539, 222 S.W.2d 720 (1949), where the court recognized that at the time of the decision in City of Springfield v. Clouse, supra note 49, the
legislature had in fact separated the governmental and proprietary function in Missouri by
creating a Board of Public Utilities with authority that is usually possessed by private
corporations, Mo. Rav. STAT. §§ 91.330-.430 (1949).
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However, it should be pointed out that if the nature of the function is looked
to, and not the source of its financing, the governmental-proprietary distinction
takes on a rational explanation. Certainly it can be seen that there is a difference
between the granting of rights of collective activity to policemen and the granting
of rights of collective activity to grounds-keepers in municipal parks. It is upon
this difference that perhaps a logical clarification of public employee labor relations can be made.
D. The Right To Organize
Although the status of labor relations in the public service has been characterized as chaotic, 0 s there is one facet that is clear. The growth of organized labor
in the public service has been phenomenal, and the trend continues. In a period
from 1943 to 1958 union membership of public employees increased 60% as opposed to a 32% increase in membership of private employee unions. 99 In the short
period 1956-58, the membership of public employee unions increased 13%o, whereas
the membership in unions of private employees decreased almost 2y.
The number of cities having public employee unions more than doubled during the period
from 1943 to 1958.201 These statistics illustrate the clear trend towards increased
unionization in public employment. In fact, one need only follow current events
to notice that teachers, social workers and other public
20 2 employees are in fact organizing and demanding better wages and conditions.
The law of union organization of public employees is not as clearly defined as
are the trends and purposes of union activity. Although it is fair to say as a general proposition that the right to organize is permitted, it is interesting to note
that only seventeen states have affirmatively granted the right by constitutional
provision or by statute.2 03 Arizona, Arkansas, New Jersey and South Dakota have
constitutional provisions which assure the right to organize, either explicitly, or as
interpreted by case law.2 0 4 For instance the New Jersey constitution, in explicitly
granting the right to organize, provides: "Persons in public employment shall
have the right to organize, present to and make known to the State, or any of its
political subdivisions or agencies, their grievances and proposals through representatives of their own choosing." 23 The Arkansas constitution, however, is not as
clear. It provides that "No person shall be denied employment because of membership in . .. a labor union .... I'M This raises the question of whether the term
"person!' includes public employees. In affirmatively answering this, the Arkansas
Supreme Court in Potts v. Hay" 7 held that the "plain language" of the provision
198 Rock, Practical Labor Relations in the Public Service, 18 PUB. PERSONNEL REV. 73
(1957), as cited at 12 LAB. L.J. 13 n.3 (1961). See generally 12 LA. L.J. 13 n.3.
199 Brinker, Recent Trends of Labor Unions in Government, 12 LAB. L.J. 13, 14 (1961).
200 Id. at 15.
201 Id. at 16.
202 E.g., "Strike in a Welfare State [Welfare Workers]," Time Magazine, Jan. 22, 1965,
p.20; "Teamsters to Fight Court Rule on Pike [New Jersey Turnpike Workers]," Newark
News, May 3, 1964, p.29; "Teachers and City Board Agree to a One-year, No-strike Pact,"
New York Times, Sept. 14, 1962, p.1; "City Gives Police Right to Bargain," New York Times
Oct. 17, 1962, p.35; "Agreement Signed by DS, Union [Department of Sanitation Employees],'
Long Island Star Journal, Feb. 3, 1961, p. 4 .
203 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
and Wisconsin. Arizona and New Jersey have both constitutional provisions and statutes. See
notes 60 & 65 infra.
204 ARiz. CONST. art. 25; ARK. CONST. amend. 34, as held applicable to public employees
by Potts v. Hay, 229 Ark. 830, 318 S.W.2d 826 (1958); N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 19; S.D.
CONsT. art. 6, § 2, as held applicable to public employees by Levasseur v. Wheeldon, 79 S.D.
411, 112 N.W.2d 894 (1962).
205 N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 19.
206 ARK. CONST. amend. 34.
207 229 Ark. 830, 318 S.W.2d 826 (1958).
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leaves but one interpretation;
the term person includes everyone, including the
2°
public employee.
Fifteen states grant the right to organize in public employment by statute.20 9
Some of these grants are with reservations. For instance, Massachusetts does not
permit policemen to organize,21 0 while California limits the right only to firemen.2 1 1
However, the right to organize, when given, is usually given without reservation.
The District of Columbia, Indiana, New York, Pennsylvania and Washington
have executive provisions which permit union organization in the public employment. New York,212 Pennsylvania 1 3 and Washington 214 grant the right through
executive orders which resemble the federal executive order issued by President
Kennedy in 1962.215 An Indiana executive order grants the right to organize to
employees of state mental hospitals, without mentioning other public employees.2 16
The District of Columbia 217 and Washington 218 have civil service rules and regulations which protect the right.
Only Alabama and Florida purport to deny public employees the right to
organize by statute.219 Even these are not outright denials. The Alabama statute
denies the right to organize to all public employees except teachers, employees of
the State Docks Board and employees of cities and counties. The Florida statute
makes it a crime for any public employee to join a union which asserts the right
to strike.
Statutes denying the right to organize to certain classes of employees are more
common. The District of Columbia, Georgia, Massachusetts, and North Carolina
have such provisions. The District of Columbia provision prohibits only policemen from joining any organization which asserts the right to strike.220 The North
Carolina statute which is similar, although expanding the prohibition to firemen,
provides that no law enforcement or fire control employee shall join a union of
national affiliation which asserts the right to strike.-2 2' Georgia and Massachusetts
have stronger
provisions, directed to policemen, completely denying them the right
2
to organize.

22

In the absence of statute, the right to organize is generally presumed to be
supported by the first amendment guarantee of free assembly. 223 It is difficult,
208 But see City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947), which
held a similar provision not to be applicable to public employees. The court said that if the
legislature had intended inclusion of public employees, it would have so provided.
209 ALAsE:A STAT. ANN. §§ 23.40.010-.040 (Supp. 1962); Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §
23-1302 (1956); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1962 (firemen only), CAL. GoV'T. CODE § 3502; HAWAII
REv. LAWS § 3-80 (1955) (if right to strike is not asserted); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch.
149, §§ 178D&F (Supp. 1964) (except policemen); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.454(8) (1960);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.52 (Supp. 1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13B-2 (1965); N.Y. CIV.
SERv. LAWS § 108(1); N.D. REv. CODE ANN. § 34-11-01 (1960); ORE. REv. STAT. §
243.730 (1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-11-1 (Supp. 1964), § 28-9.1-4 (Supp. 1964)
(firemen), § 28-9.2-4 (Supp. 1964) (policemen); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154C(4)5154C(6) (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-16-2 (Supp. 1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(2)
(Supp. 1965).
210 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, §§ 178D & F (Supp. 1964).
211 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1962.
212 By Nelson E. Rockefeller, Aug. 28, 1963.
213 By George M. Leader, May 27, 1957.
214 By Albert D. Rosellini, February, 1958.
215 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962). See text accompanying notes 156-62 supra.
216 .By Matthew E. Welsh, July 31, 1962.
217 District Personnel Manual, Ch. 25, Employee Relations, September, 1962.
218 Merit System Rules, Article XX, May 25, 1962.
219 ALA. CODE tit. 55, §§ 317(1)-(4) (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 839.221 (Supp. 1964).
220 D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-125 (1961).
221 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-97 (1965).
222 GA. CODE ANN. § 54-909, § 54-9923 (1961); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 149, § 178D
(Supp. 1964). Both provisions have criminal sanctions.
223 See Anderson, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 601, 611.
Presumably the first amendment argument would rely upon the fundamental right of free
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though, to measure the acceptance of this argument, for the right of organization
existence
is seldom challenged. One can only point to the apparently unchallenged
224
of public employee unions in almost every large city and state.
Where, however, the right to organize was challenged, the Supreme Court
of South Dakota in Levasseur v. Wheldon225 pointed to the first amendment, without discussion, to grant to public employees the right to organize. The Court
utilized the first amendment right to free assembly to make applicable to public

employees a South Dakota constitutional provision 226 which guarantees that no

one is to be denied employment because of membership in a labor union. Although
not often cited explicitly, the first amendment argument is the underlying pressure in support of public employee union organization.
It is clear that the arguments for granting the right of organization do not
support the rights of bargaining or striking. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in
New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. American Fed'n of State Employees, Local
1511,227 pointed out that the right to organize does not carry with it the right to

strike. A Texas Civil Court of Appeals, in Beverly v. City of Dallas,2?s held that
a statute which gave to public employees the right to organize did not incorporate
the right of collective bargaining and contracting. It seems proper to limit the
right to organize for presenting grievances so as not to include the right to bargain. Presenting grievances through a representative is a unilateral affair on the
part of the union, whereas negotiating involves bilateral discussion, imposing upon
the employer the duty to meet with the union and perhaps to contract. The
arguments which support giving public employees the right to organize do not
justify giving them rights of collective bargaining and striking.
Although the right to organize does not carry with it the right to bargain
collectively or to strike, it may imply a right not to organize. Whether this right
not to organize exists depends on the nature of the law in a jurisdiction. There
are two types-one simply grants to public employees the right to organize, 22 9
whereas the
other is an extension of right-to-work law so as to include public
230
employees.
It is the right-to-work-law jurisdiction in which the right to organize also
includes the right not to organize. This correlative right has been supported by
the reasoning that to require organization would be discriminatory. 23' Thus the
Supreme Court of Montana struck down a union security provision in a contract
between the teachers union and the school district because it was discriminatory
in favor of unions. 23 2 A Minnesota statute reflects this same reasoning. It provides:
assembly as incorporated in the fourteenth amendment by De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937). It was held there that legislative intervention by states of this right would be
justified only when the right was abused - ". . . [L]egislative intervention can find constitutional justification only by dealing with the abuse. The rights themselves may not be
curtailed." Supra at 364-65.
224 See Brinker, supra note 199, at 16.
225 79 S.D. 411, 112 N.W.2d 894 (1962).
226 S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 2.
227 83 N.J. Super. 389, 200 A.2d 134 (1964).
228 292 S.W.2d 172 (Tex.Civ.App. 1956).
229 See, e.g., note 234 infra. Of the fifteen states affirmatively granting the right to
organize by statute, see note 209 supra, nine have simple right-to-organize statutes: Alaska,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota. Oregon, Rhode Island, and
Wisconsin.
230 See, e.g., note 233 infra. Of the fifteen states affirmatively granting the right to organize by statute, see note 209 supra, six have right to work laws which are applicable to
public employees: Arizona, 'California, Hawaii, Minnesota, Texas, and Utah.
231 See, e.g., Mugford v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d
745, 747 (1945) (dictum), where the court said: "A citizen who is a member of a union
cannot, by that fact alone, be barred from a position in the public service."
232 Benson v. School Dist. No. 1 of Silver Bow County, 136 Mont. 77, 344 P.2d 117
(1959).

NOTE
"Public employees shall have the right to form and join labor organizations, and
shall have the right not to form and join labor organizations.... It shall be unlawful to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee for the exercise
of such rights ....,,233 In these right to work jurisdictions a union shop will not
stand. Thus one must not be deceived by the discrimination argument into believing
that this expands the right to organize. On the contrary this tends to curb the
right thereby retarding unionization.
The unions naturally favor the jurisdictions which simply grant the right to
organize, without explicitly providing for the right not to organize. The Oregon
statute exemplifies the type found in a right to organize jurisdiction. It provides:
"Public employees have the right to form, join and participate in the activities of
labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of representation and
collective bargaining with their public employer on matters concerning employment relations." 23 4 Under such a statute a union may acquire a union shop whereby
employees must join the union 'as a condition of employment. A union which recently negotiated a union shop in Philadelphia claims to have eighty-eight other
such contracts in effect.2 3 5 It is this arrangement which the unions favor and for
which they are pressing.
The right to organize is by no means an absolute right, and the reasons which
support the. right are by no means inviolable. Municipal and state rules and regulations, even ordinances, which prohibit a certain class of employee from joining
a union or organization have been upheld all over the country.23 6 The court in

CIO v.

City of Dalla2 37 claims that its review of the case law sustains this.

The employees most often affected by these prohibitionary regulations have
been policemen and firemen,2 35 although teachers23 9 and even all the public employees of a city have been included.2 40 As has been said several times: "Police
and fire departments are in a class apart. Both are at times charged with the
preservation of public order, and for manifold reasons they owe to the public their
undivided allegiance." 241 In order to sustain these various regulations and ordinances, the strong arguments supporting organization have to be held inapplicable.
Few courts have addressed themselves directly to the argument that the first
amendment protects the right to organize. Justice Holmes, while on the Massachusetts bench, presented the best reasoning to circumscribe the first amendment
233 MxNN. STAT. ANN. § 179.52 (Supp. 1964). (Emphasis added.)
234 ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.730 (1963).
235 See Zander, A Union View of Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, 22 PUB.
ADmIN. REv. 6, 8 (1962).
236 Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs of City of Los Angeles, 78 Cal. App.2d 638, 178
P.2d 537 (1947) (joining union or organization not exclusively composed of policemen pro318, 116 N.E. 158 (1917)
hibited); People ex rel. Fursman v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill.
(teachers belonging to union not hired); Local 201, American Fed'n of State Employees v.
City of Muskegon, 369 Mich. 384, 120 N.W.2d 197, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1964)
(policemen); City of Jackson v. McLeod, 199 Miss. 161, 24 So.2d 319 (1946) (policemen);
King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 206 S.W.2d 547 (1947), appeal dismissed, 333 U.S. 852 (1948)
(policemen); Hutchinson v. Magee, 278 Pa. 119, 122 Atl. 234 (1923) (firemen); CIO v.
City of Dallas, 198 S.W.2d 143, (Tex.Civ.App. 1946) (public employees of Dallas not
permitted to unionize); San Antonio Fire Fighters' Local 84 v. Bell, 223 S.W. 506 (Tex.
Civ.App. 1920) (firemen); McNatt v. Lawther, 223 S.W. 503 (Tex.Civ.App. 1920) (firemen); Carter v. Thompson, 164 Va. 312, 180 S.E. 410 (1935) (policemen); Seattle High
School Ch. No. 200 v. Sharples, 159 Wash. 424, 293 Pac. 994 (1930) (teachers belonging
to union not hired).
237 198 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Tex.miv.App. 1946).
238 Of the eleven cases cited supra note 236, eight pertain directly to policemen or firemen. See also notes 220-222 supra.
318, 116 N.E. 158 (1917); Seattle High School
239 People v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill.
Ch. No. 200 v. Sharples, 159 Wash. 424, 293 Pac. 994 (1930).
240 CIO v. City of Dallas, 198 S.W.2d 143 (Tex.Civ.App. 1946).
241 Fraternal Order of Police v. Harris, 306 Mich. 68, 10 N.W.2d 310, 312 (1943);
Carter v. Thompson, 164 Va. 312, 180 S.E. 410, 412 (1935).
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argument. Holding in McAuliffe v. Mayor of City of New Bedford2 42 that the
first amendment rights are personal and may be waived by the person involved,
he stated that one "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire
in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free
speech ....
-243 By force of similar reasoning, if one wishes to unionize he may,
but he may not also have the privilege of working for the government. There
is no law which purports to let a person have both, when a statute forbids unionization.
A lower
California court supported this reasoning in Perez v. Board of Police
2 44
Comm'rs.

In upholding a rule forbidding policemen from unionizing, the Court

said that the statute does not regulate union activity; it regulates the police department. The Washington Supreme Court supported its decision in Seattle High
School Ch. 200 v. Sharpes45 with the same reasoning. Upholding a regulation which
denied teachers employment because they were union members, the Court said
that teachers were free to contract for their employment. If they did not favor the
conditions of the contract, they were not obligated to enter into it. The concept
that one waives certain rights when he enters into the public employment as illustrated by Perez and Sharples, is the gravamen of this argument.2 4 This argument
is no longer the weightiest in sustaining regulations prohibiting organization. More
often discussed are the policy considerations that arise upon permitting certain
classes of employees to unionize. It has been held that to permit policemen to join
unions would present a conflict of allegiance which would jeopardize a policeman's dedication to the safety and well-being of a community. 47 For should a
concerted activity of a union, as a strike, get out of hand, it is the policeman who
is responsible for keeping order. 2"
A similar, but not as convincing, argument is made for prohibiting the unionization of firemen. 249 The service which firemen perform is certainly essential to
the welfare of the community. However, the interruption of fire control, although
a serious matter, does not250 go to the heart of law and order as would an interruption of police protection.
242

155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).

243

Id., 29 N.E. at 517-18.

244

Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 78 Cal. App.2d 638, 178 P.2d 537 (1947).

245 159 Wash. 424, 293 Pac. 994 (1930).
246 As restated in City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539, 542 (1947),
... [A] public officer or employee, as a condition of the terms of his public service, voluntarily gives up such part of his rights as may be essential to the public welfare or be required
for the discipline of a military or police organization." See also Fraternal Order of Police
v. Harris, 306 Mich. 68, 10 N.W.2d 310 (1943); King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 206 S.W.2d
547 (1947), appeal dismissed, 333 U.S. 852 (1948); 010 v. City of Dallas, 198 S.W.2d
143 (Tex.Civ.App. 1946).
247 Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 78 Cal. App.2d 638, 178 P.2d 537 (1947); King
v. Priest, supra note 246.
248 The Boston Police Strike, Sept. 10, 1919, illustrates the breakdown of law and order:
"Late that afternoon, at five forty-five, the union policemen struck; 1,117 of 1,544 patrolmen
left their posts. That night there was disorder, rioting and robbery. While the situation was
grave, the disorder consisted chiefly of boisterous rowdyism ....
Shop windows were broken;
some jewelry was stolen; shoes and hats were removed from store cases; cans were taken
off the shelves in grocery stores. Men are reported to have come supplied with suitcases to
carry off the loot."
SPERO,

GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER

272-73 (1948). But cf. that during a police strike in

Cincinnati in September, 1918, home guardsmen and boy scouts kept the order for three
days after which police returned to work, with no serious consequences having occurred.
SPERO, op. cit. supra at 252.
249 See McNatt v. Lawther, 223 S.W. 503 (Tex.Civ.App. 1920); San Antonio Fire
Fighters' Local 84 v. Bell, 223 S.W. 506 (Tex.Civ.App. 1920).
250 The vital necessity of police protection and national security is reflected in Executive
Order 10988, § 16, 27 Fed. Reg. 551, 556 (1962), which specifically excludes from its provisions, the CIA, the FBI, and other similar agencies.

NOTE
It has been said that the "most compelling objection to unionization of public
employees springs from the realization that whenever workers organize, they increase their capacity to strike. ' 25' This is essentially a manifestation of a fear
of strikes and not an argument against organization per se. Of course, to support
this position it would have to be presumed that strikes are against public policy.
This position which supports regulations against tempting the strike is not wanting
court in Perez
for support. The regulation which was held by a lower California
252
The rule was predenied affiliation with any union of non-police membership.
sumably directed against the strike weapon with which most unions are armed.
Similarly a North Carolina statute prohibits law enforcement employees and fire
control employees from affiliating with a national union asserting the right to
bargain.2 5 3 This force of reasoning was carried to another area in Young v. Board
of Bldg. and Safety Comm'rs of City of Los Angeles'"4 where the court upheld a
rule which prohibited the employment of union officers, but permitted employing
rank and file union members. All these situations seem to rest on the notion that
organizational prohibitions can be sustained by reason of increased capacity to
bargain or to strike. It would seem that in order to maintain this argument, the
particular class of public employee affected by such a rule would have to be one
in which a strike would clearly be of serious consequence to the safety and wellbeing of the community.
Although legislation is not yet predominant in granting the right to organize,
the right is generally afforded. For policy considerations, policemen have been a
significant exception. Firemen have also been excepted, but not to the same extent.
to
Aside from these exceptions, the trend has been towards increasing the right
255
organize thus recognizing what Justice Hughes has called a fundamental right.
E. Collective Bargaining in Public Employment
"To seek a living wage and normal working conditions, the policeman must
rely on the fairness of municipal officials to whom he is compelled to take his case.
In this respect, policemen have not been notably successful. 251 6
The above quote exemplifies the situation facing over seven million state,
county and municipal employees throughout the country.257 They are denied the
right to bargain collectively with their governmental employer to acquire those
rates
benefits given employees in private industry.25 8 As a result, government 2wage
59
have not kept up with wage increases enjoyed by non-public employees.
It has been suggested that "a government which imposes upon other employers
certain obligations in dealing with their employees may not in good faith refuse
to deal with its own public servants on a reasonably similar favorable basis. .... "2,0.
Nevertheless, recent court decisions indicate that the policy of denying public
employees the right to collectively bargain is still being followed by the courts. 261
251 Note, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 75 HtAv. L. Rav. 391, 395 (1961).
252 Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 78 Cal. App.2d 638, 178 P.2d 537 (1947).
253 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-97 (1965).
254 100 Cal. App.2d 468, 224 P.2d 16 (1950).
255 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1936).
256 Keresman, Constructive Employee Relations in Police Departments, 8 LAB. L.JF 556,
557 (1957).
257 86 Mo. .AB.REv. 732 (1963).
258 31 A.L.R. 2d 1142.,
259 See generally, Rains, Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 8 LAB. L.J. 548

(1957).

260 American Bar Ass'n, Second Report of the Committee on Labor Relations of Government Employees, p.2 (1955).
261 Dade County v.Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 157 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1963), appeal dismissed mem., 166 So. 2d (Fla. 1964), Solicitor General invited
to file briefs for the U.S., 379 U.S. 898 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 971 (1965); New
Jersey Turnpike Authority v. American Federation of State Employees, Local 1511, 83 N.J.
Super. 389, 200 A.2d 134 (1964).
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This section analyzes the reasons and policies underlying government's refusal to
extend to its own employees those rights accorded to the workers engaged in private
enterprise.
1. Existing Law
One of the main reasons why the right of collective bargaining is not extended
to government employees seems to be that public employees cannot be treated the
same as their counterparts in private industry. This is so because of the nature of
their governmental employer and the legislative restrictions within which it must
operate. This theme, often referred to as the public-private employment distinction,
permeates a letter from President Roosevelt to the National Federation of Federal
Employees. It read in part:
All Government employes should realize that the process of collective
bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public
service. It has its distinct and insurmountable limitations when applied
to public personnel management. The very nature and purposes of Government make it impossible for administrative officials to represent fully or to

bind the employer in mutual discussions with Government employe organi-

zations. The employer is the whole people, who speak by means of laws
enacted by their representatives in Congress. Accordingly, administrative
officials and employes alike are governed and guided, and in many instances
restricted,
262by laws which establish policies, procedures, or rules in personnel
matters.

This legislation often takes the form of civil service laws regulating wages, working
conditions, and grievance procedures for public employees.2 63 Since the legislature sets the rules governing discharge and grievance procedures and state and
municipal budgets fix wages of public employees, it is felt that the public official
does not have the authority to discuss these pre-determined items with the employees he supervises. For him to do so would be a direct departure from the
expressed intent of the legislature. 26 4 This is unquestionably the view taken by
several courts dealing with the problem.
For example, in Nutter v. City of Santa Monica,2 65 the California Labor
Relations Act, which guaranteed the right of collective bargaining, was held inapplicable to the City's motor coach operators because a civil service law was in
effect. The Court said that in the absence of an express provision to the contrary,
the existence of the civil service law reflected a legislative intent that public employees were not to be treated in the same manner as privately employed workers.

A similar result was reached in Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.2 66
In that case, city employees were held to be covered by a budgetary and civil service
2 67
system created in accordance with the power vested in the city by its charter.
A variation of the argument that collective bargaining is to be denied to public
employees because of existing civil service laws is that a state or city would surrender
some of its sovereign authority and discretion by allowing its officials to bargain
with its employees.2 5 Furthermore, it is felt that the state or city should not relin262 As cited in State v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 37 Cal.2d 412, 232 P.2d 857,
860 (1951); City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539, 542 (1947);
C.I.O. v. City of Dallas, 198 S.W.2d 143, 144-45 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
263 See Anderson, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 1961 Wis. L. Rxv. 601, 614. See
generally, 56 MicH. L. Rv. 645 (1958).
264 Zander, A Union View of Collective Bargainingin the Public Service, 22 PuB.
REv. 6, 9-10 (1962). See generally, 56 MicH. L. Rav. 645 (1958).

AgmIN.

265 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P.2d 741 (1946).
266 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945).
267 Accord, State v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 37 Cal.2d 412, 232 P.2d 857 (1951);
Miami Water Works, Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946);
Weakley County Municipal Elec. Sys. v. Vick, 43 Tenn. App. 513, 309 S.W.2d 792 (1957).
268 'City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App.
2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (1949); Mugford v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266,
44 A. 2d 745 (1945); City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947);
Zander, supra note 264 at 10.

NOTE
quish its discretion in such matters as the hiring and firing of employees.2 6 9 The
rationale of this argument is that the legislature, rather than being bound for any
fixed period
of time, should be free to change its conditions of employment as it
270
sees fit.
Another reason for refusing to allow collective bargaining to public employees
was presented in Springfield v. Clouse. 17' There, the Missouri Supreme Court
distinguished public employees from non-public employees in the following words:
".. . [A] public officer or employee, as a condition of the terms of his public service,
voluntarily gives up such part of his rights as may be essential to the public welfare....

272

Another objection to allowing collective bargaining in public employment
was presented in Springfield. The gravamen of this objection was that the fixing
of wages and conditions of employment was a legislative function which, according
to principles of constitutional law, could not be delegated to any administrative
or executive department. Therefore, since fixing wages and conditions of employment involves lawmaking, they cannot be the subject of bargaining by executive
or administrative officials without statutory authorization. While it may be that
executive or administrative officers have been granted a limited amount of discretion, it can only be exercised within standards set by the legislature.
In addition to the judicial refusal to extend the right of collective bargaining
to public employees, Texas and North Carolina have statutes denying the right
of collective bargaining. 273 For example, the Texas statute provides:
It is declared to be against the public policy of the State of Texas

for any official or group of officials of the State, or of a County, City,
Municipality or other political subdivision of the State, to enter into a
collective bargaining contract with a labor organization respecting the wages,
hours, or conditions of employment of public employees, and any such
contracts
entered into after the effective date of this Act shall be null and
274
void.

Against the great weight of authority denying the right of collective bargaining to public employees, there are several counterarguments which seek to discredit and raze 'the traditional wall of denial. It is first argued that collective
bargaining contracts could be made subject to any outstanding civil service provisions. Thus, if any conflict develops between the terms of an agreement and
the existing law, the contract would be automatically subordinated to the law. 2 7 5
This argument speaks for itself. If the public employer is subject to "laws which
establish policies, procedures or rules in personnel matters," 27 6 there seems little
objection to a system whereby employees, or their representatives, meet with the
employer to bargain within the framework of existing legislation.
In an analogous situation, the Connecticut Supreme Court, in Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Education,2 7 7 had no objection to collective bargaining within
the power given the Board to make contracts. In that case, the Board questioned
whether or not it had the power to bargain with the teachers' representatives on
wage increases, even though it had done so in the past. Although it held that a
269 City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & 'onstr. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App.
2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (1949); Mugford v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266,

44 A.2d 745 (1945); City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
270 Anderson, supra note 263 at 615.
271 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
272 Id. at 542. (Emphasis added.)
273 N.C. GnN. STAT. § 95-98 (1965); TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. art. 5154(c) (1962).
274 TEx. Rav. Crv. STAT. art. 5154(c) (1962). The constitutionality of the act was upheld in Beverly v. City of Dallas, 292 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956), which also declared
the act

to

be decisive in prohibiting collective bargaining to public employees.

275 56 Mic. L. Rav. 645, 647 (1958).
276 Letter from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to National Federation of Federal Employees,
Aug. 16, 1937, found in cases cited note 262 supra.
277 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951).
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strike by the teachers to compel the Board to bargain with their union was unlawful, the court went on to say that there was no reason why the teachers could not
organize and bargain for wages and working
2 7 8 conditions which "may be in the
power of the board of education to grant.
Two practical examples illustrate the fact that civil service laws and public
employee bargaining can coexist.2 7 9 The experience of the City of Philadelphia

presents an outstanding illustration. In 1958, a contract was signed giving the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 33, the
exclusive bargaining rights for all non-uniformed employees of the City. Then
in 1962, the city approved a modified union shop agreement establishing three
categories of employees: (1) those who must join the union as a condition of
employment, (2) those for whom union membership is voluntary, and, (3) those
for whom union membership is strictly prohibited. The city personnel director
was given jurisdiction over labor relations and authorized by the civil service
commission to engage in negotiations. He was also empowered to enter into agreements with Council 33. Neither the city council nor the civil service commission
are directly involved in the bargaining. However, those items agreed on at the
bargaining table must be approved by the city council and the commission so that
such items can be reconciled with the civil service rules and the budget planned
for the ensuing year. Constant communication between the city officials participating in the negotiations and the members of the city council and civil service
commission is emphasized, so that each is aware of what they can do or may be
called on to do.
In view 'of the great weight of authority which denies public employees the
right of collective bargaining, the Philadelphia agreement is truly a "precedentsetting plan."280 To progress from a history of no collective bargaining to a plan
affecting 18,000 city employees is, as Mr. Donald C. Wagner, Managing Director
281
of Philadelphia, stated, a "long step towards stabilizing" city-union relationships.
Another example illustrating that collective bargaining can function within
the framework of civil service procedures and budgetary considerations is presented
by the City of Cincinnati. The history of public employee unionization in that
city was not unlike any other city or county in the country; namely, public employee
unions were denied the right to collectively bargain with their employer. However,
in 1960, a union-management agreement was reached. The most important feature
of this agreement was an exclusive bargaining rights clause in which the city agreed
not to change any of the then existing working conditions. It was further agreed
that the city administrators were not to make any recommendations to the city
council affecting the bargaining unit without negotiating with the employees' union.
From these two examples, it may be seen that collective bargaining can work
successfully within the framework of civil service legislation. The recognition that
a city or county is restricted by legislatively established budgets and procedures
serves as a natural limitation on what the city may grant, or what the union may
seek. Any departure from such limitation will undoubtedly be struck down by the
courts. 282

However, the mere assertion that the area is governed by civil service,

standing alone, does not appear to be a sound basis for denying public employees
the right of collective bargaining. 283 Subordinating an agreement to the existing
278 Id., 83 A.2d at 486.
279 The following information is taken from Zander, supra note 264 at 10-12.
280 Business Week Aug. 6, 1960, p. 61.
281 N.Y. Times, July 31, 1960, p. 57.
282 Accord, State v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 37 Cal. 2d 412, 232 P.2d 857 (1951);
Miami Water Works, Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946);
Weakley County Municipal Elec. Sys. v. Vick, 43 Tenn. App. 513, 309 S.W.2d 792 (1957).
283 Erie County Water Authority v. Kramer, 4 App. Div. 2d 545, 167 N.Y.S.2d 557
(1957), aff'd., 5 N.Y.2d 954, 184 N.Y.S.2d 833, 157 N.E.2d 712 (1959). See also, American
Bar Ass'n, Second Report of the Committee on Labor Relations of Governmental Employees,
p. 2 (1955).

NOTE
law would readily resolve any possible conflicts. This could easily be done as is
illustrated by a 1962 contract between the City of New York and the United
Federation of Teachers. A key provision of their agreement specified that: "If
any provision of this agreement is or shall at any time be contrary to law, then
such provision shall not be applicable or performed or enforced, except to the
extent permitted by law ....
284
In answer to objections that collective bargaining in public employment would
involve an unlawful delegation of authority or a surrender of sovereignty or discretion, it has been. said that such is not the case if the concept of sovereignty is
brought into proper focus. Mr. Arnold S. Zander, former president of the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, feels that ultimately, sovereignty resides in the people who delegate its exercise to the government which
they have established. If this is true, then granting the right of collective bargaining does not involve a surrender of sovereignty; rather, something new is created
to meet an existing need.2 " Applying this proposition to the area of collective
bargaining in public employment, Mr. Zander concluded that:
When the government employer fails to keep abreast of conditions, some
method of handling the situation must be devised. If the people who are
the real source of sovereign power conclude that a new method should be
devised, they are not surrendering anything; rather they are requiring law
and order in a field where such law has never existed and an institution
which will guarantee the rights of employees in public employment.288

Even though government has not kept pace with the advantages accorded to
employees in private industry287 no legislature nor court has specifically adopted
the principle advanced by Mr. Zander as a basis for allowing collective bargaining.
This is not to say, however, that this principle may not be lurking behind the reasoning of some courts which have justified collective bargaining by formulating several
interesting distinctions.
Before proceeding to an analysis of judicial thinking in this area, it must be
pointed out that judicial inertia has been one of the stifling influences in the recognition of the right to collectively bargain for public employees. 28 The only method
of overcoming such judicial inaction is legislation empowering the state or its
subdivisions to negotiate collective bargaining agreements with its employees. Thus,
unions attach a great deal of importance to the securing of legislation embodying
their programs and objectives. One of the main strategems employed by the unions
to obtain such legislation is the application of political pressure. Apparently, this
tactic works, for Mr. Zander regards the use of such pressures as "one of the most
important channels used by public employee unions to support their programs .... ,,128'a
Several states have enacted such legislation. However, these statutes are not
uniform in content, some being more restrictive than others. For example, Alaska
has a very general statute providing:
The state or a political subdivision of the state, including but not limited
to an organized borough, municipal corporation, independent school district, incorporated school district, and public utility district, may enter into

a contract with a labor organization
whose members furnish services to the
2 0
state or political subdivision. 9

284 Other contracts containing a similar provision include: Cincinnati (1960); Dayton
(1964); Philadelphia (1963); Green Bay (1964); Marion County, Wash. (1964); Preble,

Wis. (1964). These contracts are on file in the office of the Notre Dame Lawyer.
285

Zander, supra note 264 at 9.

286 Ibid.
287 Rains, supra note 259.

288 Glidewell v. Hughey, 314 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1958); Miami Water Works, Local 654v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946); Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's Union, 52 Wash. 2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099 (1958); International Union of Operating.
Engineers, Local 321 v. Water Works Bd. of Birmingham, 276 Ala. 462, 163 So. 2d 619 (1964)

289 Zander, supra note 264 at 9.
290 ALASKA CoMp. LAWS ANN.

§ 23.40.010 (1962).
127, § 63b 109(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964); Oa. Rv.

Compare, ILL. ANN.
§ 243.740 (1963).

STAT.

STAT.

ch.
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Other statutes permitting collective bargaining confine themselves to towns2 91 or
public utility district employees. 29 2 Another general class of statutes excludes certain
groups of employees. For example, the Massachusetts collective bargaining statute
provides: ". .. [A]ny city or town may engage in collective bargaining with labor
organizations representing its employees, except police officers, and may enter into
'293
collective bargaining agreements with such organizations.
As previously noted, courts have not been overanxious to extend the right of
collective bargaining to public employees. Thus, in only one case has a court
rejected the argument that collective bargaining in public employment would be
an unlawful delegation of authority and a surrender of sovereignty and discretion.
This was done by the Arizona Supreme Court in Local 266, InternationalBhd. of
Electrical Workers v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power
District. 94 In that case, a power district, created by statute, was given the right
to negotiate and enter into whatever contracts were deemed necessary by the District. The main function of the District was production of hydroelectric power for
consumption by approximately 100,000 private and commercial interests. Its
employees of the District were represented by a union. When a collective bargaining agreement between the District and its employees expired, the District refused
to negotiate with the union on the new contract. It argued that since it was a
political subdivision of the state, it did not have the power to bargain, citing Mug297
96
ford,295 Springfield and Nutter.
. In distinguishing these cases, the Arizona Supreme Court considered the differences between this power district and most other municipal corporations. In
so doing, the court first defined public employment as "employment by some branch
of government or body politic specially serving the needs of the general public. 2 98
It then applied this definition to the following distinguishing facts: the owners of
the district were private individuals; the employees were not paid from public funds
as are public employees; and, the profits realized from operation of the distri&
went to private individuals for their own use. On the basis of these facts, the court
concluded that if it was necessary for the District to enter into an agreement with
its employees to secure its continuous operation, it could not refuse to do so on
the grounds that it did not have such power. To the contrary, the District was
held to have the power because of the proprietary nature of its function, even
though it had been created by an act of the state legislature. The court reasoned
that "when a governmental entity functions in a proprietary nature . . . it should
be permitted to perform it in a manner as efficiently as would a private person."29
In rejecting the argument that to grant collective bargaining authority -to the
District would involve a surrender of its discretion, the high court of Arizona
pointed out that the District could enter or refuse to enter a particular agreement
as it saw fit.
The principle advanced by Salt River -that
when a government acts as a
291 N.H. REv. STAT. AN. § 31.3 (Supp. 1963).
292 IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-2401-2415 (1952); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.454(15) (1960);
Mo. ANN. STAT. ch. 295 (1949); NEB. REv. STAT. § 14-1825 (1962); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:13B-2 (1965); Oso REv. CODE ANN. § 717.03 (Page 1954); OKL.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 82,
§ 862(m) (1951); S.D. CODE § 52.1729 (Supp. 1960); WASH. REv. CODE § 54.04.170
(Supp. 1964).
293 MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 40, § 4c (1961). Compare, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-466
(Supp. 1964), which excludes teachers.
294 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954).
295 Mugford v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945).
296 City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
297 Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P.2d 741 (1946).
298 International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement &
Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393, 402 (1954).
299 Id., 275 P.2d at 399. (Emphasis added.)

NOTE
private person, it should be treated as such - was incorporated into statutes by
several states. These statutes permit collective bargaining by employees of public
300
utilities, including such operations as transit systems, and water and gas works.
In Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,30 for example, the California statute creating the transit authority provided
that it could enter into collective bargaining agreements with its employees. The
California Supreme Court held that this statute superseded the common law rule
nullifying such agreements. Aside from these statutes, however, the Salt River case
stands alone in recognizing and applying the governmental-proprietary distinction.
The distinction has otherwise been discussed, but never accepted, for several reasons.
One line of reasoning in rejecting the distinction has been that it was created
for tort actions against a city. It is felt, therefore, that the distinction is misused
when it is advanced as a basis for extending collective bargaining to public employees. For example, in City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council,30 2 the California Court of Appeals refused to consider
the governmental-proprietary dichotomy in deciding whether city water and electrical workers had the right to bargain with the city. The court said that it could
find no legitimate basis for making such a distinction. It stated that the distinction
was developed for determining the tort liability of a municipal corporation, and
that its purpose was to eliminate the technical defense of sovereign immunity behind
which governmental bodies shielded themselves from the torts of their employees.3 0 3
Other cases have also rejected the governmental-proprietary distinction as a basis
for extending collective bargaining to public employees. They reason that the
general welfare and public safety will be impaired by its application in certain
304
cases.
Some courts, on the other hand, recognize the governmental-proprietary dichotomy, but refuse to apply it where the statute creating the proprietary unit of
the city or state does not clearly specify the powers of the unit. For example, in
Weakley County Municipal Electric System v. Vick,3 0 5 the Tennessee Court of
Appeals recognized that the municipality was acting in a private corporate capacity,
as if it were a purely private employer engaged in producing electricity. Nevertheless, since the electric system did not have the express statutory authority to
contract, the court held that the employees
of the System could not engage in
3 06
collective bargaining with their employer.
2. Trends and Conclusions
An argument often advanced for the proposition that public employees should
have the right to strike, is that employees engaged in the same or similar occupation in private industry do have such a right.307 The fact that in one case the
government is the employer, and in another case private industry is the employer,
300 See compilation of statutes, supra note 292.
301 54 Cal. 2d 905, 355 P.2d 905 (1960).
302 94 Cal. App. 2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (1949).
303 Other cases doing away with the governmental-proprietary dichotomy include: City
of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947); New York City Transit
Authority v. Loos, 2 Misc. 2d 733, 154 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd., 3 App. Div. 2d

739, 161 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1957); Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's Union, 52

Wash. 2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099 (1958).
304 City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d
36, 210 P.2d 305 (1949); City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539
(1947). For a discussion of this doctrine see text accompanying note 322 Infra.
305 43 Tenn. App. 513, 309 S.W.2d 792 (1957).
306 Accord, Glidewell v. Hughey, 314 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1958); Zander, supra note 264
at 9.
307 Anderson, supra noie 263 at 607.
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furnishes no reasonable basis for varying the rights of the employees. Thus it can
be argued that there is little justification for denying the right of collective bargaining to employees of a publicly-owned electric system or transportation operation, where employees similarly engaged in private employment are not only permitted but guaranteed this right."0 8
This general rationale for extending collective bargaining rights to public
employees seems to underly the decision in Wisconsin Employment Relations Board
v. Evangelical Deaconess Society."'0 In that case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that a nonprofit hospital, certainly classifiable as a quasi-public institution,
was required to bargain with the union representing its maintenance men, engineers
and orderlies. In so holding, the Court stated that:
Collective bargaining in institutions whose operation is so intimately connected with human life places a great responsibility on the parties thereto
...but there is no reason to suppose that if each enters into negotiations
ready to cooperate and appreciating the problems of the other party to the
negotiation, there may not be a fair, friendly and mutually satisfactory
adjustment of whatever controversies may arise .... 310

The rationale of the Wisconsin Court would seem to be applicable, by analogy,
to public employees working in public service institutions. Identical consequences
are present in allowing either one of these groups of employees to collectively
bargain with their employer. That danger of course is the possible disruption of
an absolutely necessary public service. The Wisconsin Supreme Court was aware

of this danger, but was convinced that responsibility to the public welfare on both
sides of the bargaining table would minimize the possible detrimental effects.
Based on this analysis, it is suggested that collective bargaining can be successfully utilized in public employment. The experiences of Philadelphia and Cin-

cinnati, where employees are allowed to bargain, would certainly seem to buttress
this conclusion, as would the fact that 16 states have enacted legislation permitting
collective bargaining in one form or another.31 '
If statistics are indicative of trends, collective bargaining is becoming increasingly prevalent in public employment. For example, the American Federation of
Teachers reports that as of May 30, 1964, it has secured bargaining agreements
covering 100,109 teachers. In 1953, the figure was 42,212.-' s The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees reports that as of February 1,
1965, it has 397 bilateral agreements in 30 states and Washington, D.C., and 127
unilateral agreements in 27 states, with union security clauses in 65 of these agreements.313 With new agreements being signed every day, 14 it is a reasonable conclusion that collective bargaining has arrived in public employment.

F. Strikes in Public Employment
Public opinion on collective bargaining by public employees is closely related
to the public attitude toward the use of strikes in governmental employment. It
has been suggested that fear of such strikes has adversely affected passage of
legislation which would extend the right of collective bargaining to public em308 Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340
U.S. 383 (1951); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
309 242 Wis. 78, 7 N.W.2d 590 (1943).
310 Id., 7 N.W.2d at 592-93.
311 For a compilation of statutes see notes 280-83 supra.
312

THE

STORY OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS

1963-64, p. 68

(a report

to the American Federation of Teachers 1964 Convention in Chicago).
313 Analysis of American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Union
Agreements as compiled by the Department of Research and Retirements, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, on file in the office of the NOTRE
DAME LAWYER.

314 See, e.g., Wisconsin Teamster, Mar. 25, 1964, p. 127 (Watertown, Wis. contract);
AFL-CIO News, Oct. 24, 1964, p. 3 (Chicago, Ill. contract).
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ployees.315 In this section, the present legal status of public employee strikes will
be examined and analysis will be made of the opposing arguments.
In general, public employees are denied the right to strike by judicial decision.310 Two theories are utilized to support this denial: 1) the lack of a profit
motive in public employment makes resort to the strike unnecessary; and 2) the
idea that government operations are not to be impeded.
In Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Education,3 1 7 the Court employing
the profit motive argument, concluded that strikes by governmental employees are
unnecessary because the economic motivations found in private industry are not
present in public employment. In holding that the teachers' union could not
engage in a strike, work stoppage, or any other collective refusal to carry on their
teaching duties, the Court said:
Under our system, the government is established by and run for all of
the people, not for the benefit of any person or group. The profit motive,
inherent in the principle of free enterprise, is absent. It should be the
aim of every employee of the government to do his or her part to make
it function as efficiently and economically as possible. The drastic remedy
of government
of the organized strike to enforce the demands of 5unions
employees is in direct contravention of this principle. 15

City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, Local 930,819 supports the
Norwalk decision and presents an additional ground for denying the right to strike
to public employees: "governmental functions may not be obstructed or impeded."320 Thus, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that public employees
to strike if we are to maintain efficient and beneficial govmust be denied the right
3 21
ernmental operations.
The rationale of the Pawtucket case, that government functions are not to be
impeded, has been employed by some courts as the sole basis for denying public
315 Anderson, supra note 263 at 628.
316 Newmarker v. Regents of Univ. of California, 160 Cal. App. 2d 640, 325 P.2d 558
(1958); City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App.
2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (1949); Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83
A.2d 482 (1951); Miami Water Works, Local 654 v. City of Miami, 57 Fla. 445, 26 So.
2d 194 (1946); Dade County v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 157 So. 2d 176
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), appeal dismissed mem., 166 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1964), Solicitor
General inuited to file briefs for U.S., 379 U.S. 898 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 971 (1965) ;
International Longshoremen's Union v. Georgia Ports Authority, 217 Ga. 712, 124 S.E.2d
733 (1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 922 (1962); Hansen v. Commonwealth, 344 Mass. 214,
181 N.E.2d 843 (1962); City of Detroit v. Division 26, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 332 Mich. 237, 51 N.W.2d 228 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 805 (1952);
City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 131 A.2d 59 (1957);
New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. American Federation of State Employees, Local 1511,
N.J. Super. 389, 200 A.2d 134 (1964); Pruzen v. Board of Educ., 9 N.Y. 2d 680, 212 N.Y.S.2d
416, 173 N.E.2d 237 (1961); New York City Transit Authority v. Loos, 2 Misc. 2d 733,
154 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 739, 161 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1957);
City of Cleveland v. Division 268, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 41 Ohio Op.
236, 90 N.E.2d 711 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1949); Broadwater v. Otto, 370 Pa. 611, 88 A.2d 878
(1952); City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, Local 930, 87 R.I. 364, 141
A.2d 624 (1958); City of Alcoa v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 760, 203 Tenn.
12, 308 S.W.2d 476 (1957); South Atlantic Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Harris County Nay.
Dist., 358 S.W.2d 658, aff'd, 360 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
975 (1963); Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's Union, 52 Wash. 2d 317, 324 P.2d
1099 (1958). See generally, Spero, GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER 16-44 (1948).
317 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951).
318 Id., 83 A.2d at 484.
319 87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624 (1958).
320 Id., 141 A.2d at 628.
321 Other cases directly in line with this reasoning are: International Longshoremen's
Union v. Georgia Ports Authority, 217 Ga. 712, '124 S.E.2d 733 (1962), cert. denied, 370
U.S. 922 (1962); Hansen v. Commonwealth, 344 Mass. 214, 181 N.E.2d 843 (1962); Board
of Educ. v. Public Employees' Union, Local 63, 233 Minn. 144, 45 N.W.2d 797 (1951);
New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. American Federation of State Employees, Local 1511, 83
N.J. Super. 389, 200 A.2d 134 (1964); South Atlantic Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Harris
County Nay. Dist. 358 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), aff'd, 372 U.S. 975 (1963).
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employees the right to strike. These courts reason that if government employees
are permitted to strike, public safety and general welfare will be endangered. City of
Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Counci 3

22

is a typical

case following this rationale. There, the California Court of Appeals, enjoining
a strike by Los Angeles water and electrical workers, emphasized the "dominant
public interest" in the "uninterrupted performance" of government functions.
In addition to the case law, 15 states and the District of Columbia have enacted
3 23
legislation denying the right to strike to those engaged in public employment.
Two additional state statutes provide that if the Governor considers a strike detrimental to or contrary to the public interest, he may seize the struck plant or function.3 24 Such a statute can be effectively used to deny public employees the right
to strike. The statutes denying the right to strike may be classified as restrictive
or general. A New York statute is illustrative of the restrictive category. It provides:
No person holding a position by appointment or employment in the government of the State of New York, or in the government of the several cities,
counties, towns, villages thereof, or any other political or civil division of
the state, or of a municipality, or in the public school service, or in any
public or special district, or in the service of any authority, commission, or
board, or in any branch
3 25 of the public service, hereinafter called a "public
employee," shall strike.

Ohio's short and simplified statute represents the more
3 26 general legislative approach.
It merely states: "No public employee shall strike."
Although the usual penalty provided for engaging in or aiding a strike is
dismissal,3 27 some statutes impose fines and/or imprisonment for public employees
participating in a strike.32 8 The District of Columbia and Florida provide penalties
for mere membership in a union asserting the right of public employees to strike.3 2 9
Although the general rule is no strike, several courts have upheld the right
to strike. The governmental-proprietary distinction has been suggested as a basis
for granting public employees the right to strike. The leading case here is Local
266, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Salt River Project Agri330
cultural Improvement and Power District.
Yet, Salt River is a difficult case to

322 94 Cal. App. 2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (1949).
323 D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-125 (1961) (police officers); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 839.221 (Supp.
1964); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 89-1301-1304 (1963); HAWAII REv. LAWS oh. 5, § 8 (1955);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2401 (1952)
(public utilities); MAss. ANN. LAWS oh. 149, § 178F
(Supp. 1964); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(2) (1960); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.51 (Supp.
1964); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-821 (1960); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAWS § 22-a(2); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 4117.02 (Page 1965); ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.760 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 215.2 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-7-45 (1956) (by specific exclusion from
labor relations act); TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c(1) (1962); VA. CODE ANN. §
40-65 (1953).
324 Mo.ANN. STAT. §§ 295.180-.200 (1949); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13B-13 (1965).
325 N.Y. Civ. Serv. Laws § 108(2). Compare Micii. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(2) (1960);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.51 (Supp. 1964).
326 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4117.02 (Page 1965). Compare HAWMAI REv. LAWS oh. 5,
§ 8 (1955); MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 178F (Supp. 1964); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-821
(1960); ORE. RXV. STAT. § 243.760 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 215.2 (1964); TEx.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c(1) (1962); VA. CODE ANN. § 40-65 (1953).
327 D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-125 (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 839.221 (Supp. 1964); GA.
CODE ANN. § 89-1303 (1963); HAWAII REV. LAWS oh. 5, § 9 (1955); MicH. STAT. ANN.
§ 17.455(4) (1960); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.54 (Supp. 1964); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 4117.05 (Page 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 215.3 (1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 40-65
(1953). In Texas, the penalty is a forfeiture of civil service rights, TEX. REv. CIV. STAT.

art. 5154c(3) (1962).
328 IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2413 (1952) ($500 to $2500 fine & 6 mos. imprisonment);
-MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 180 (1957) ($100 fine); NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 48-821 (1960)

ANN.

($10 to $5000 fine and/or 5 days to 1 yr. imprisonment).
329 D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-125 (1961) ($300 fine and/or 6 months imprisonment); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 839.221 (Supp. 1964) (discharge).
330 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954).
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apply because of the unique factual situation involved. 331 It is submitted, therefore,
that the rationale of Salt River will be limited to its own peculiar facts, and will
not be an effective advancement of the governmental-proprietary distinction as a
basis for extending the right to strike to public employees. Indeed, this distinction
has been unsuccessfully advanced in a good number of cases. The opponents of
this distinction have raised several counterarguments which can be classified as
follows: (1) if public employees are allowed to strike, the public health and safety
will be impaired; 3 2 (2) even if a city is acting in a proprietary character, it is still
333
public in nature since the city engages in the function to serve the public purpose;
and, (3) the distinction was developed in tort actions against sovereign authorities
and should not be applied in the area of public employee strikes. 34
Interpreting a special statutory provision, the Supreme Court of California
in Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,3 3 5 allowed public employees of the city transit system the right to strike. The
statute creating the transit authority empowered its employees to bargain collectively and engage in "other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,"" 06 The Court held that the statute
sufficiently expressed a legislative intention to depart from the common law rule
prohibiting public employee strikes. The majority used the statute to distinguish
several cases, 3 7 and cited Salt River as authority for interpreting the statute as a
legislative departure from the common law rule. The dissent in the Los Angeles
Metropolitan Authority case felt Salt River was distinguishable on its facts and
argued that policy considerations demand that public employees be denied the right
to strike.33 s
Upon analysis, the grave concern which courts express when asked to extend
the right to strike to public employees is not unreasonable. One has only to picture
a city with its police or fire departments on strike to appreciate the grave implications of such an extension. Even public employee unions recognize that certain
employees must not have the power to strike. For example, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees includes no-strike provisions in its
charters to police locals." 9 However, the unions do object to the blanket no-strike
policy prevailing in several states.3 40 The union objection is based on the theory
that it is illogical to deprive an employee of the right to strike simply because he
is employed in governmental service, since "many services are performed inter,41
changeably by public employees and by employees in private industry ....
331 See text accompanying note 294 supra.
332 McAleer v. Jersey City Incinerator Authority, 79 N.J. Super. 142, 190 A.2d 891
(1963); Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's Union, 52 Wash. 2d 317, 324 P.2d
1099 (1958).
333 City of DEtroit v. Division 26, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 332 Mich.
237, 51 N.W.2d 228 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 805 (1952); Donevero v. Jersey
City Incinerator Authority, 75 N.J. Super. 217, 182 A.2d 596 (1962); City of Alcoa v.
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 760, 203 Tenn. 12, 308 S.W.2d 476 (1957).
334 New York City Transit Authority v. Loos, 2 Misc. 2d 733, 154 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup.
Ct. 1956), aff'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 739, 161 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1957).
335 54 Cal. 2d 905, 355 P.2d 905 (1960) (5-4 decision).
336 Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act, as amended 1959, CAL. STAT. ch.
547, § 3.6(c) (1957).
337 The more important cases distinguished were Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of
Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951); City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers'
Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 131 A.2d 59 (1957); City of Pawtucket v. Pawtucket Teachers' Ass'n,
Local 930, 87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624 (1958); Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's Union, 52 Wash. 2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099 (1958).
338 54 Cal. 2d 905, 355 P.2d 905, 911 (1960) (Justice Schauer dissenting).
339 Zander, A Union View of Collective Bargainingin the Public Service, 22 Pub. Admin.
Rev. 6, 9 (1962).
340 Ibid; Public Employees in the Central States Area (A Manual for Union Organizers,
prepared by the Research Dept.,- Central Conference - of Teamsters, p. 27, Nov., 1959).
341 Zander, supra note 339 at 9.
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The American Civil Liberties Union has echoed this union objection, stating that
strikes should be denied342public employees only in those areas where the public
welfare will be impeded.

In view of the fact that the right to strike-denied to public employeesis protected in similar areas of private industry, perhaps the above criticisms have
some validity. For example, while the right to strike is guaranteed by law to private
hospital employees,3

43

no similar protection is afforded public hospital employees. 344

Furthermore, in Dade County v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees,345 the
Florida District Court held that employees of a privately owned transit system lost
their right to strike when the system was purchased by the municipality. There
seems to be little logic in allowing a strike against a privately-owned utility while
denying the right to strike against a public utility performing the same function.
Without disparaging the validity of the above criticisms, a cautious approach
must be taken in their application. Public convenience and necessity may well
demand that city employees not be given the right to strike even though similarly
engaged employees in private industry do not face such a restriction. For this very
reason the municipality may have purchased the transit system in the Dade County
case -to protect its citizens from strikes by transit employees.
It must be acknowledged, however, that regardless of public opinion towards
strikes, and no matter what legal barriers may be raised by legislatures or courts,
public employee strikes will never be entirely eliminated. This is the nature of
our free society.3 46 One need only recall the New York public school teacher's
strike in April of 1962 to be reminded that public employees can and do strike.
However, even though such tactics are available to public employees, it is significant
that their use of the strike is diminishing. 341 While the average number of strikes
by public employees during the period from 1942 to 1953 was 34 per year, the
annual average dropped to 14 strikes during the period from 1954 to 1961.34
The use of mediation and arbitration procedures has received considerable
attention as an alternative to the strike as a means of soliciting and procuring
public employee demands. The need for such procedures in the absence of the
right to strike was recognized by the Supreme Court of New York in New York
City Transit Authority v. Loos.3 49 Even though the court enjoined a city transit
worker's strike, it sympathized with the problem facing public employees in their
efforts to secure the benefits of collective bargaining. The court stated:
Deprived as they are of the right to strike . .. there should be statutory
provision, in case of a dispute between labor employed by and the management of a public authority, for the ultimate determination of wages, hours,
working conditions, etc., by a responsible and competent governmental
agency wholly outside of and beyond the control of the employing authority. Perhaps methods of mediation ... could be devised .... 850

The American Bar Association apparently agrees with this position. It advocates
some form of machinery for adjusting the grievances of public employees.3 51 The
342 N.Y. Times Apr. 13, 1959, p. M33. Also in agreement are Professors Robert F.
Fuquay and Russell W. Maddox, Oregon State Univ., Department of Political Science,-quoted
in The Public Employee, July 13, 1962, p. 6.
343 St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 264 Wis. 396, 59 N.W.2d
448 (1953); Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. v. Evangelical Deaconess Soc'y, 242 Wis.
78, 7 N.W.2d 590 (1943).
344 See Anderson, Labor Relations in the Public Serice, 1961 Wis. L. Rzv. 601, 607.
345 157 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
346 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Report No. 247, Apr., 1963, p. 1.
347 Id. at 2.
348 Ibid.
349 2 Misc. 2d 733, 154 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 739, 161
N.Y.S.2d 564 (1957).
350 Id., 154 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
351 American Bar Ass'n, Second Report of the Committee on Labor Relations of Government Employees, pp. 6-9 (1955).
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Association feels that it would be "too idealistic" to presume that employees
352 can
personally approach their superior with a complaint which he will remedy.
While the idea of settling such disputes through mediation is fundamentally
sound, it has not escaped criticism. The objection is made that if the dispute is
not settled at the mediation level, then resort to arbitration would be necessary
to achieve a conclusive and binding solution. It is contended that submission to
of legislative responsibility;
arbitration would constitute an unlawful delegation
35 3
i.e., fixing terms and conditions of employment.
In the Norwalk case, the Connecticut Supreme Court answered this objection.
It stated that arbitration was permissible within certain limits. Namely, the subject
matter of the arbitration must be limited to a determination of the governmental
agency's liability to its employees within the framework of existing laws. The court
reasoned that policy considerations underlying the law are not proper subjects of
arbitration. In other words, it would not be within the province of an agency to
grant a wage increase exceeding a ceiling fixed by the legislature. Therefore, submission of such a dispute to arbitration would be improper. However, there seems
to be no apparent objection to submitting a wage increase or similar demand to
arbitration where the agency has the power to grant such demands. Mediation
has been judicially approved by a number of jurisdictions, 54 and ten states have
enacted legislation providing for submission of disputes to arbitration and/or mediation by certain classes of public employees.3 55
Mediation and arbitration have been effective measures for adjusting griev35s 7
ances in private industry 56 and in helping to promote and maintain "labor peace."
Consequently, there appears to be no reason why such methods should not be
utilized in the area of public employment. Some of the more recent public employee agreements contain clauses providing for arbitration or mediation of disputes which cannot be settled at the employer-employee level.358 Such contracts
tend to indicate that both government and its employees are becoming more aware
of the fact that this may be the answer to their problem. The American Bar Association feels there is every reason to believe that the use of such grievance pro-

352 Id. at 7.
353 Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482, 486-87
(1951).
354 Petition of the Labor Mediation Bd.. 365 Mich. 645, 114 N.W.2d 183 (1962); City
of Detroit v. Division 26, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 332 Mich. 237, 51 N.W.2d
228 (1952); appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 805 (1952); In re Richfield Federation of Teachers,
263 Minn. 21, 115 N.W.2d 682 (1962); City of Cleveland v. Division 268, Amalgamated
Ass'n of Street Employees, 141 Ohio Op. 236, 90 N.E.2d 711 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1949).
355 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 10-3-8 to 10-3-11 (Smith-Hurd 1962) (firemen); IND.
ANN. STAT. §§ 40-2401-2415 (1952) (public utilities); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.454(14)
(1960) (public utilities & hospitals); MrNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 418.21 (1958) (police & fire
depts. in cities of Ist class status); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13B-18 to 34:13B-23 (1965)
(public utilities); N.D. REv. CODE § 34-11-01 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 243.750 (1963);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 213.1 (1964) (public utilities); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.1
(1956) (police); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 1-111.70(4)(b) (Supp. 1965).
356 American Bar Ass';r Report of the Committee on Law of Government Employee
Relations, p. 7 (1959).
357 Ibid.
358 See, e.g., a contract entered into -by the Brown County Highway Comm'n, Brown
County, Wisc., and Teamsters Union, Local 75, covering the maintenance employees of the
Comm'n. A clause of the contract provides: "Should any disagreement arise between the
Employer and the Union which cannot be amicably settled, the matter shall be submitted
to a Board of Arbitration . .. ." The clause goes on to specify the method to be employed
in selecting the arbitrators, the number to be selected, etc. Similar provisions are found in
other contracts made by the Teamster's locals and the City of Jeannette, Pa. (1964); Green
Bay, Wisc. (1964); Allouez, Wisc. (1964); and Preble, Wisc. (1964). Copies of the above
contracts are on file in the office of THE NOTRE DA E LAWYER.
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cedures will promote better employer-employee relations, and lead to the elimination of strikes by public employees. 59
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

This portion of the Survey deals Wvith the problems encountered by the public
employee in his personal dealings as they affect his public employment. The concept of public employment spans the entire spectrum of positions within the political body. Our analysis concerns only the problems arising within the structure
of the executive branch of government, since the judicial and legislative branches
are subject to a form of special regulation and self-regulation.
Broadly speaking, a conflict of interest arises any time a public employee,
charged with complete loyalty to his governmental employer, faces a situation
where he can choose between two courses of action, one which will benefit him
personally, the other which will achieve the maximum benefit to the public. It
can be seen that the basic elements are the conflict in the courses of action and
the benefit to be derived therefrom, along with the discretion in the public employee
to choose between the two.
The element of discretion could suggest that the problem is one peculiarly
applicable to executives and officers of the public. They are certainly the persons
facing these problems most frequently. But the scope cannot be so limited. Many
statutes phrase their proscriptions in terms encompassing both officer and employee. The logic of the problem also suggests that whenever any person on the
public payroll is invested with the kind of discretionary authority necessary for
a conflict of interest he should be considered within the terms of the law, irrespective of his title or classification. Thus, it can be seen that this analysis should not
be limited to the higher echelons of public administration. It is intended to extend
as far as the problem requires.
A. Interests in Public Contracts
1. Direct Interests
Before the legislative pronouncements in the area of public officers' interests
in public contracts, the common law approach was one of principle, resembling
the courts' approach to private trusts. "The officers of government are trustees
and both the trust and trustees are created for the benefit of the people."3 60 This
approach is sound and fairly easily understood. It was obvious that a trustee could
not have an adverse interest in a contract made for his cestui. Since public office
is a trust, the same principles analogously applied.
Legislators, however, were far from content with the judicial solution to the
problem. They could observe the judicial confusion in determining which of the
public employees were officers and therefore trustees for the public.361
, In 1892
the Supreme Court of New York took the broad approach and included almost
everybody. It stated: "[ilt is contrary to good morals and public policy to permit
municipal officers of any kind to enter into contractual relations with the municipality of which they are officers .... 362 On the other hand, even recent cases
have found some high officers not within the conflicts of interest laws. In Marion
County v. Dufficys3" the Court held that the county physician is not a public officer
and was therefore free to contract with himself for the leasing of offices to himself.
The legislators adopted the broad approach to the problem and tried to get
359
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360 Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 10 N.J. Super. 545, 77 A.2d 255, 265 (Ch.
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361 See, e.g., State ex rel. Stock v. Kubiak, 262 Wis. 613, 55 N.W.2d 905 (1952).
362 Beebe v. Sullivan County, 64 Hun. 377, 19 N.Y.S. 629, 630 (Sup. Ct. 1892), aff'd,
142 N.Y. 631, 37 N.E. 566 (1894).
363 144 C.A.2d 238, 300 P.2d 721 (1956).

NOTE
almost every public employee within their statutes. Though their statutes aimed
at a single mode of conduct, they adopted language such as "no member, officer
or employee,"3 64 "no state, county or municipal officer . . . nor any deputy or
employee of any state, county or municipal officer" 3 65 or "any public officer or
public employee."3 0 However, some courts adopted a narrow standard by which
to judge the coverage of the statute. Though not dealing with a statute with very
broad language, in the Dufficy case the Court said: "Thus, it is clear that, since
the Legislature legislated on this subject and concerned itself only with 'officers,'
it must have intended to exclude 'employees.' ,',3 The Court mistook the intention
of the legislature, however, and the situation was corrected by a 1961 amendment
to the California statute, specifically including employees within its proscriptions.3 68
It would seem that the public servant involved in the contract must be one
who could abuse his discretion to further his personal interest. If he acts as a
public officer but exercises no influence over the making of the contract, generally
he will be outside the legal sanctions. For example, in Tonkins v. City of Greensboro389 a member of the parks and recreation commission organized a corporation
to purchase the city swimming pool. The Fourth Circuit said that the statutes "
did not apply since the officer involved was a member of a commission which
served only in an advisory capacity while the legal authority to sell the property
was in the city council. It is significant to note that a question was raised as to
motives, since there was a strong suggestion that the purpose of the sale was the
continuation of racial discrimination. The Fourth Circuit rejected this on the
grounds that the evidence was not sufficient to support this claim. It is apparent
that the motives behind the contract are not relevant to the question of a conflict
of interest, since the3 71
proscription is based on the interest, not the cause, whether
heinous or laudatory.
Thus we can return to the concept expressed earlier: a conflict of interest
can arise only where there is some discretion to abuse. It has been stated in different ways by different courts, but the underlying principle remains. 72 Some older
cases indicate a rigid standard which takes no account of any abuse of discretion,
but these seem to have led to extreme results, little followed today.3 73 However,
one recent case in the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the statute had been
violated when a contract was let by the secretary of state to a firm in which the
chairman of the highway commission was a stockholder.3 7 4 The dissent seemed
to express a more reasonable interpretation of the provision and is much more
consistent with the general thinking in the area. The more general rule seems to
be that even where there may be a close relationship between the contracting agency
and the agency of which the interested official is a37member,
absent a showing of
5
actual improper influence, there will be no violation.
Apparent as it may seem that the courts are strict guardians of the public
trust when armed with broad statutes, the appearance is more than a little decep364
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tive. 27 The statutes are clear and demanding when applied to a direct contractual interest, and the courts find few problems enforcing the law against such
interests. The fact is, however, that a direct contractual interest is rare. The
rationale is simple. An honest public servant will not enter into such a direct
contract for he generally knows that it may cast a shadow of doubt upon him,
regardless of how admirable or innocent his purpose. The dishonest public official
will usually be clever enough to hide his corrupt influence in some form or device
which can shield his dealings from the public view. Thus the intentional direct
contract interest is a small problem at its worst.
This is not to say that such interests are extinct. Some exceptions have even
worked their way into the law to make direct interests, in some instances, permissible. If the interest in the contract clearly is accidental or results from an emergency, some court may be inclined to disregard the danger to the public as minimal. In Miller v. Huntington & Ohio Bridge Co. 3 77 the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia was confronted with a situation where a member of the county
court was a director of the bank being paid to handle the financing for the purchase of a bridge. It was shown that the member did not know of the agreement
with his bank. The Court could have sidestepped the question by holding that
merely being a director was not an interest. The Court faced the question by
finding him to be sufficiently interested in the contract, yet said: ". . . we think
it would be unreasonable to hold that a member of the court could have been
influenced by an agreement of which he had no knowledge. 3 78 Thus the contract was upheld. The case apparently denotes an encroachment by a form of rule
of reason.
Somewhat in the same vein is a recent Tennessee case, State v. Yoakum. 3 7 9
Decided by the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, the case concerned a loan of
money to the school district by a bank whose president and controlling stockholder
was a member of the county school board. The Court held that a loan of money
is not a contract within the meaning of the conflict of interest statute, absolving
the transaction on that ground. A rule of reason approach more akin to that
suggested in the Miller case""0 would commend itself as more rational, perhaps
even easier of judicial administration.
New York has apparently added another exception to the general rule against
contract interests by placing condemnation proceedings on a special footing. The
New York Supreme Court, in the case of In re Parking Place in the Village of
Hempstead,s ' said firmly: "It seems clear that the acquisition of real property by
condemnation possesses no contractual attributes."'382 It concluded that the statute
forbidding interests in contracts38 3 does not apply, relying heavily upon the proposition that condemnation proceedings are subject to the supervision of the courts.
This position, however, seems open to question about the practical ability of the
courts to assure proper representation of the real party in interest, the public.
These reasoned exceptions, however, are far from commonly accepted. For
example, in Marin County v. Messner,8 4 the Court refused to concede any exception and held that a county engineer violated the statute 8 ' by contracting with
the county for the rental of equipment used in his work, even though he was
376
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377
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reluctant to agree to rent the equipment and did so only at the behest of the
county board of supervisors.
2. Corporate Holdings
When concerning ourselves with interests in contracts, a discussion of direct
interests is merely preliminary. The problem truly presents itself in questions of
indirect interests, and the major vehicle of these indirect interests is the corporation. Given the situation where an official has an interest in a corporation and
the corporation an interest in a public contract: is the official interested in the
contract so as to contravene the applicable statute?
The logical, reasonable approach to this question seems to be whether or not
the official is so interested in the corporation as to equate the interests of the corporation with the interests of the official. An example of this approach is State v.
Robinson.9 6 There the department of motor vehicles bought $31.40 in gas and
oil products from a corporation one of whose stockholders was the registrar of
motor vehicles. In holding the contract illegal, the Court said:
•. .[S]tatutes ... when they prohibit an officer from becoming interested

directly or indirectly in a contract made by him in his official capacity,
apply where the interest of the officer is that of a substantial stockholder
3 7
and officer in the corporation with which he makes the contract.

In Robinson, the Court, dealing with the problem of criminal sanctions, said:
"Criminal liability must depend upon evidence as to interest other than the bare
existence of the relationship of a stockholder in a corporation. The interest made
criminal by the statute is a question of fact ... ," This kind of ad hoc approach
and rule of reason appears more difficult of application than a blind standard
of any interest being condemned. But pushed to its logical ends, that standard
would indict most, if not all, of our public officials, due to the complex, interrelated nature of our society. Given that we need some line of demarcation, a rule
of reason commends itself as familiar to the courts and at the same time logically
defensible.
This rule of reason appears to have been translated into the "substantial interest" test, as mentioned in State v. Robinson."* In Alexander v. Ritchie390 it was
termed a "substantial portion" ' ' of the stock in the corporation which would
disqualify the official. There it was held that 525 out of 1150 shares was such a
"substantial portion" so as to make the contract illegal and require the removal
of the official from office. Thus it appears that 39
this
"substantial interest" rule
2
isnot the same as a mere majority-minority analysis.
Another tack suggested is not the importance of the official in the corporation,
but the importance of the corporation to the official. An official might have stock
in a large corporation such that it would not come within any "substantial interest"
rule, while at the same time the holding could be the principal or only basis for
the official's wealth. The Supreme Court of Washington put it succinctly when
it said: "That which touches one's pocket is apt to warp the judgment." 393 An
interest may touch one's pocket without being a substantial part of the corporation's stock. More precisely the question should be divided into the importance
of employment by, or salary from, the corporation, which will be discussed later;
and the significance of the dividend income or value of the stock. As to the latter,
the courts have not recognized any standard. For the court which rejects any
386 71 N.D. 463, 2 N.W.2d 183 (1942).

387 Id., 2 N.W.2d at 188.
388 Id., 2 N.W.2d at 189.
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391 Id., 53 S.E.2d at 739.
392 See, Peabody v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 330 Ill.
250, 161 N.E. 519 (1928) (24%)-;
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interest as unlawful, the question is academic. The courts applying the "substantial interest" rule evidently feel that their test is sufficient and they need not consider this aspect.3" 4
The older cases demonstrate the rigidity of the rule that any interest in the
corporation renders the contract unlawful. In People ex rel. Schenectady Illuminating Co. v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Schenectady County,39

a member of the board of

supervisors was the secretary and treasurer of the Schenectady Illuminating Co.,
a local utility unit of a major system. The contract in question was for light bulbs
sold to the county in the amount of $7.44. The court said: "He has . . . no sub-

stantial financial interest in that company, being the owner of only one share of
stock." 396 However, he needed no substantial financial interest. Thus the contract
was declared void as a conflict of interest, even though the interest was not substantial.
Though the view in Schenectady County397 is somewhat extreme, a few courts
still adhere to it. In Reetz v. Kitch99 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin said:
". .. the stockholder in a corporation has such an interest as will disqualify him
from acting on behalf of a city or other governmental unit.".399 The only interest
involved there was that of the city clerk who owned stock in the bank which was
to sell a building to the city.
This rigid thinking may also influence a court in its interpretation of statutes,
as it did in Parkin Printing & Stationery Co. v. Arkansas Printing & Lithographing
4 0°
Co.
This 1962 holding was that a public officer who was a stockholder in a
corporation had an interest in a contract between the corporation and the state.
A strong dissent by Justice Johnson demonstrated the weakness of the majority
position by showing that the contract voided was advantageous to the state and
the question of improper influence was actually quite negligible. What is more
40 1
significant, the majority seems to have disregarded the language of the provision
they were interpreting.
Legislatures have entered this area of corporate holdings as conflicts of interest
by providing that a certain proportion of the stock of a corporation is not such
an interest. It amounts to a legislative adoption of the "substantial interest" rule
except for the relatively insignificant amounts being exempted. In all, a total of
nine states have injected a form of exemption for minor corporate holdings into
their laws.
Of these nine,404six have percentage limits, ° 2 two have dollar amount
40 3
limits,

and one has both.

An example of a simple percentage exemption is the Hawaiian provision for
interests in corporations. 40 5 It is typical of the simple percentage exemption, specifying that a holding of not more than five per cent in a corporation shall not be
subject to the conflict of interest proscription. Kentucky has a similar provision,
again at the five per cent level. 406 It is interesting to note that five per cent is the
largest interest permitted by any state, except Massachusetts. Apparently this figure
394 See text accompanying note 48 infra.
395 166 App. Div. 758, 151 N.Y.S. 1012 (1915).
396 Id., 151 N.Y.S. at 1012.
397 166 App. Div. 758, 151 N.Y.S. 1012 (1915).
398 230 Wis. 1, 283 N.W. 348 (1939).
399 Id., 283 N.W. at 355.
400 234 Ark. 697, 354 S.W.2d 560 (1962).
401 ARY. CONST. art. 19, § 15.
402 HAWAII RIv. LAws § 9-54 (1955); Ky. REv. STAT. § 61.096(2) (1963); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 18-301 (Supp. 1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.13 (Supp. 1965); CAL. Gov'T CoD
§ 1091.5(a); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 268A, § 7 (Supp. 1964).
403 N.Y. PUB. OFFICRs LAw § 74(3)(1); ORE. REv. STAT. § 279.360 (Supp. 1964).
404 OHio REV. CODE § 2919.11 (Page 1953).
405 HAwAn REv. LAWs § 9-54 (1955).
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is below anything a court would consider a "substantial interest." 407 Nebraska and
Wisconsin have
been even less generous, permitting only one and two per cent
408
respectively.
California has seemingly tried to cover all of the possibilities with a series of
different tests for the exemption. 40 9 They exempt any holding of less than three
per cent but add the conditions that the total dividends from the corporation
shall not exceed five per cent of the employee's total annual income, nor shall all
other payments (primarily salary and fees) exceed five per cent of his total annual
income. This approach reflects the considerations expressed above, namely that
a person can be very concerned about the welfare of a corporation, even though
his holdings do not amount to a great portion of its stock. A significant consideration under the California statute is the degree of the officer's dependence upon
the corporation for his material well-being. Ohio also has a mixed form of exemption in permitting an interest in a corporation so long as the interest is five per
cent or less and the value of the holding is less than $500.410
Massachusetts has raised the percentage limit while broadening the base of
the coverage.4'1 Thus while the limit is at ten per cent of the total proprietary
interests in the corporation, it applies to the total of the official's holdings and
those of his immediate family. Evidently the Massachusetts legislators felt that
a ten per cent holding would not be sufficient to influence the judgment of the
official, and at the same time concluded that the interests of the members of his
immediate family would influence him as much as his own. Both seem to be
tenable approaches.
The other two of the nine states with corporate holding exemptions, New
York and Oregon, provide limited exceptions. New York's exemption is for an
interest of more than $10,000 in an activity regulated by a state agency, provided
the interest is registered with the state.412 Oregon, on the other hand, has probably the most severely limited exception. It applies only to public officers in cities
with a population of less than 5000 and only with the unanimous approval of the
governing body, and in all cases is limited to $500 in any year. 413 It is suggested
that not many officers will qualify for this exception.
Such exemptions for corporate interests may not give the public servant much
freedom. There are, however, a few other areas which remain uncovered by the
proscriptions against conflicting interests. One of these may be the centralized
purchasing of all state supplies. With such a scheme there is no reason why a
state should fear the interests of its employees, since the final arbiter of all purchases is an independent body. This narrows the problem to the conflicts of interests of the few members of the state purchasing agency. These can be reached
by a rigid standard without burdening the entire structure of public employment.
Of the states which have adopted a system of centralized purchases, only two
maintain a contract interest prohibition against state officers not within the central
purchasing agency. 414 All, of course, have provisions against the members of the
central purchasing agency being interested in a contract. 415 The penalties for
violation on the whole seem to be more stringent when provided for this particular
agency, often providing as high as five years imprisonment plus fines. 410 Of course,
407 See, Peabody v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 330 Ill.
250, 161 N.E. 519 (1928).
408 NEB. REv. STAT. § 18-301 (Supp. 1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.13 (Supp. 1965).:
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centralized purchasing, in addition to being advantageous to the state as regards
efficiency, removes the opportunity for a corrupt official to violate his trust. This
seems a more desirable way to protect the public than punishment of offenders.
Competitive bidding may also be a method of assuring the public a fair and
honest transaction. The relationship of competitive bidding to conflicts of interests
in public contracts is, however, unsettled. In City of Valdosta v. Harris17 the
Court pointed out that the "[r]elation of a bidder to the ' mayor
does not render
41 8
the latter disqualified to award the contract to the former.
While six states provide simply that the prohibition against interests in contracts
shall not apply if the contract is let to the lowest responsible bidder,419 Massachusetts combines this with the condition
42 °that the interest still be less than ten
per cent of the total proprietary interests.
It may be that there is some latitude where a public officer is the only party
willing or able to supply the required goods or services. A South Dakota Code
provision illustrates this latitude by providing that a contract with such an in21
terested official shall not be subject to the proscription against conflicts of interest.
In Oregon, however, such latitude has not been allowed. There, a question arose
as to the deposit of funds by a school district in the only bank in the district, the
manager of which was a member of the school board. In the absence of such a
provision the Attorney General of Oregon would not permit the interest and directed
the school board to find another bank in the county. 422 Due to the sparse authority
in the area, no conclusion as to the extent of such permissible interests can be
reached.
3. Indirect Interests
Thus far we have been discussing the relatively direct ways in which a public
official may be interested in public contracts and the different ways these interests
may be viewed by the law. But the statutes usually say something like "any interest,
direct or indirect 4 23 when proscribing conflicts of interest. The only way to describe an indirect interest is an interest in the interest of another. In the area of
public contracts, this would broadly describe the role of the subcontractor. This
leads to the question of whether a public official can be interested as a subcontractor in a public contract.
First, we must divide the question into two kinds of subcontracts; those pursuant to an agreement between the contractor and the public official prior to the
making of the general contract with the public body, and those not pursuant to
such an agreement. Clearly the former kind of relationship is unlawful. In Emanuel
v. Engst, 24 the mayor had sold land with a promise that he would get the city
to buy a certain amount of gravel from the buyer. The Court found the contract
for the purchase of gravel to be void because of. the mayor's interest and refused
any help to the defrauded buyer, intimating a kind of in pari delicto rule. When
the subcontract is made pursuant to an agreement, it seems clear that the subcontract is a kind of reward for having influenced the general contract, and it is
417 156 Ga. 490, 119 S.E. 625 (1923).
418 Syllabus of the court, No. 10, City of Valdosta v. Harris, 156 Ga. 490, 119 S.E. 625,
627 (1923). See also, Panozzo v. City of Rockford, 306 Ill. App. 443, 28 N.E.2d 748 (1940).
419 E.g., CoLo. Rzv. STAT. § 3-4-6 (1953): ". . . provided that this restriction shall not
apply in cases where the purchase of supplies . . . is made upon a contract awarded after
open competitive bidding and such member .
FLA. STAT. ANN.

.

§ 839.091(a) (Supp. 1964);

HAw~AI RV. LAws § 9-54 (1955);
REV. STAT. § 279.362 (Supp. 1963).

. is the lowest responsible bidder. . .

."

Also,

GA. ConE ANN. § 23-1713 (Supp. 1963);
OHro REv. CoDE ANN. § 2919.09 (Page 1953); ORE.

420 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 268A, § 7 (Supp. 1964).
421 S.D. CODE § 10.0708(2) (Supp. 1960).
422 OPs. OaE. ATT'Y GEN. No. 5424 (1962).
423 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, § 3 (Smith-Hurd 1934).
424 54 N.D. 141, 208 N.W.840 (1926).
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thus close to being a bribe. Directors of School Dist., Thurston County v. Libby

was a situation where the school district, of which Mrs. Libby was a director and
its clerk, made a contract with certain employees of the Libby farm for the transportation of the Libby children to school. It seems that the employees had an
agreement to give Mrs. Libby a portion of the money they received from the school
district. The Supreme Court of Washington was kind enough not to describe the
payment as a bribe, but decided that the contract was void due to Mrs. Libby's
interest and therefore payment upon it was properly refused. 426
It is clear that this agreement or arrangement does not have to be written.
In fact, it need not even be spoken. In People v. Darby 42 7 the agreement was
deduced from the circumstances and the peculiar activities of the public official
involved. Darby was a member of the Los Angeles Board of Education and leased
a building he owned to an ice cream company for what was found to be twice its
value. He then had himself put on the purchasing committee and argued that his
lessee should get a substantial portion of the school system's ice cream business.
The Court said: "If the jury were convinced by all the evidence that appellant
intentionally created a situation whereby he became interested in the contract to
be awarded by the board and that he actively participated in effectuating the
contract their verdict cannot be upset." 428 Though the court relied on the jury's
verdict, it seems clear that the underlying principle is that proof of the agreement
established the unlawful interest. The Court, in so concluding, relied upon an
earlier California case, People v. Deysher 29 in establishing the existence of an
agreement. There a county supervisor ordered improvement of the county roads
and the contractor rented equipment from a copartnership of which the county
supervisor was a member. The Court said:
The purchase, after award of contract and without previous agreement
so to do, by the contractor ... from a member of the board awarding the
contract . . . does not create . . .an interest in the contract which will
invalidate it .... However, if the purchase is made pursuant to
430an agreement, made before the award of the contract, the latter is void.
A recent case adopted this same approach. In State v. Holovachka,43 1 the

chairman of the board of public works bought public contracts at a discount
through a company he owned. The Supreme Court of Indiana rejected his con-

tention that he had no interest until his purchase of the contracts, the evidence
showing that the pattern of the sales of the contracts suggested an agreement. Thus
the conclusion seems to be that any subcontract or interest obtained subsequent to
the making of the general contract is an invalidating interest if it comes about
pursuant to an agreement or arrangement made prior to the general contract.
Though the law is settled with regard to subcontracts made pursuant to an
agreement, it is far from settled with regard to subcontracts free from any such
43 2
collusive agreement, the statement of the California Court in People v. Deysher
notwithstanding. The courts seem to be divided into two camps, each espousing
a position inconsistent with the other. One camp, asserting that a subcontract not
pursuant to an agreement is lawful, is represented by Fredericks v. Borough of
Wanaque.43 3 There, a borough committeeman was engaged in the lumber business
and Fredericks bought lumber from him in order to perform according to his
425 135 Wash. 233, 237 Pac. 505 (1925).
426 For another case close to bribery, see, State v.Hurd, 5 Wash. 2d 662, 106 P.2d 323
(1940).
427 114 C.A.2d 412, 250 P.2d 743 (1952), appeal dismissed, 345 U.S. 937 (1953).
428 People v. Darby, 114 C.A.2d 412, 250 P.2d 743, 757 (1952).
429 2 Cal. 2d 141, 40 P.2d 259 (1934).
430 Id., 40 P.2d at 261. (Emphasis by the court.)
431 236 Ind. 565, 142 N.E.2d 593 (1957).
432 2 Cal. 2d 141, 40 P.2d 259 (1934).
433 95 N.J.L. 165, 112 Atl. 309 (1920). Accord, Henscher v.Bd. of School Inspectors,
267 Ill.
App. 296 (1932) ; Ferguson v.City of Coffeevie, 77 Kan. 391, 94 Pac. 1010 (1908).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
contract with the borough. The Court pointed out that there was no agreement
or understanding and stated: ".. . manifestly the test of the legality of the contract

must be determined as of the time when the resolution
was passed, and not by
' 434
the free act of the plaintiff in purchasing materials.

Though the Court in Fredericks thought the proposition manifest, the Supreme
Court of California re-examined the logic of the position and arrived at a similar
conclusion. "The purchase, after award of contract and without previous agreement
so to do, by the contractor of material used in the performance of the contract
' ' 5
. . . does not create . . . an interest in the contract which will invalidate it."

The Court sharply defined the issue by adding:
...
however, if the purchase is
made 43
pursuant
to an agreement, made before the award of contract, the latter is
6
void."
On the other side is the camp following Bissell Lumber Co. v. Northwestern
Casualty & Surety Co. 437 There the clerk of the school district was an employee
of a lumber company which obtained a contract with the school district. The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin was quick to declare the contract void for an unlawful
interest, despite the fact that there was no element of discretion in the clerk's
relationship to the contract. The loss, however, fell upon the clerk's employer
who was refused recovery under quantum meruit. The justification for this was
stated in City of Bristol v. Dominion Nat'l Bank.438 "Those who deal with public
officials must at their peril take cognizance of their power and its limits. A failure
to do so places them in pari delicto." 439
Of the two positions on subcontractor interests, the Fredericks position is most
easily defended in logic. It, of course, relies upon a continuing chain of actual
interest to invalidate a contract, and if the interest is at any time merely prospective,
the interest is insufficient to invalidate the contract. On the other hand, the Bissell
position rests solidly upon the public policy in removing any possible questions of
tainted interests in the public contracts. The practical question of resolving questions of the existence of pre-contract agreements has probably been a great sustaining force behind the Bissell position.
Thus far we have discussed indirect interests by way of investigating the position of the official as a subcontractor. But an indirect interest may arise by way
of a creditor interest in the contract. The language of the decisions seem to indicate
that a creditor's interest alone is sufficient to invalidate the contract if the contract
would have substantial effect on the security for the debt. Apart from the language,
however, the cases usually contain a strong suggestion of other interests. In Moody
v. Shufleton 440 a county supervisor had discovered that he could not contract for
printing with the county. To avoid this barrier he sold his business to his son,
taking back a chattel mortgage for the purchase price. When his son attempted to
collect for the printing done by him for the county, the Court voided the contract
citing the debt interest of the father. The decision is certainly reinforced by the
familial relationship.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine alluded to this vague additional interest
in Tuscan v. Smith: 441 ". . . mere indebtedness does not necessarily create an
interest in fact in the business transactions of the debtor, yet it may do so; ...
The Court discussed the importance of the contract to the security and the fact
434
435
436
437
438
439
S.E.2d
440
441
442

Fredericks v. Borough of Wanaque, 95 N.J.L. 165, 112 Atl. 309, 311 (1920).
People v. Deysher, 2 Cal. 2d 141, 40 P.2d 259, 261 (1934) (Emphasis by the Court).
40 P.2d at 261.
189 Wis. 343, 207 N.W. 697 (1926).
153 Va. 71, 149 S.E. 632 (1929).
Id. at 636. Accord, Lexington Insulation Co. v. Davidson County, 243 N.C. 252, 90
496 (1955).
203 Cal. 100, 262 Pac. 1095 (1928).
130 Me. 36, 153 Atl. 289 (1931).
Id. at 293.
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that the debtor and creditor were brothers. It held the contract void for the interest
of the creditor-public official. The Court did not specify whether it was the importance of the contract to the security behind the debt or the family relation which
converted the indebtedness into a contract interest.
Moody and Tuscan hint at the idea of family relationships giving rise to conflicts of interest, but surprisingly the cases which deal squarely with the problem
have often held that the family relation is insufficient to taint the contract. The
problem most often arises for the husband-wife relationship. In Thompson v. District Bd. of School Dist. No. 1 of Moorland Tp.,4 " the Supreme Court of Michigan
was presented with the problem of a teacher who was the wife of a member of the
school board. Though to the average man this would suggest an interest, the Court
merely pointed to the Married Women's Acts to establish that the interests of a
man and his wife are separate and distinct. Though the Court may have been
deciding the case on the lack of evidence of actual misconduct, the reasoning leaves
something to be desired.
Much more logically sound is State v. Miller,444 where the Supreme Court of
Washington seemed to take it for granted that the county auditor who employed
his wife in two different positions was interested in her contract of employment.
"By so doing he received, indirectly at least, a compensation from the county in
addition to his salary."" 5 The fact that Washington is a community property state
does not seem to be sufficient to resolve the difference since the same Court as
that in -Thompson, the Supreme Court of Michigan, a few years earlier seemed to
assume that an interest in the public contract flowed from the marriage relation.
"It is useless to argue that, when the wife sells her property at the top price, and
446
thereby secures a good profit, the husband does not indirectly profit by it."1
The problem of family relations such as father and son or brothers has usually
been treated in connection with another factor which might produce an unlawful
interest in the contract, such as Moody and Tuscan. In a similar case, however,
the Supreme Court of Iowa held that where the son of a member of the city council leased equipment from his father to perform his contract with the city, it was
447
a question for the jury whether the father had an interest in the son's contract.
The Court chose not to make it a matter of law that the father-son relationship
was so close as to create an interest in one for the contracts of the other. In New
Jersey, however, it may be a matter of law that the father has an interest in his
son's contracts. In Ames v. Board of Education44' the New Jersey Court of Chancery held that a contract by a son who bought land from the school district of
which his father was a member, with money borrowed from the father, was void.
In a case involving a similar relationship, Brewer v. Howell.449 The Supreme
Court of Arkansas refused to decide that the son is necessarily interested in his
father's contracts. There the father sold supplies to the school district of which
the son was a member. In addition, the son was employed in the business by the
father. ". . . we agree with the trial court that purchases made from a business
concern employing a school board member are not in violation of the law, for
such director is not interested either 'directly or indirectly' as is contemplated by
the statute."450
In both Ames and Brewer the question of motives or fair dealings came up.
In Brewer it was noted that the prices charged by the father were fair and reasonable; the Court approved of the transactions. In Ames the Court had nothing but
443 252 Mich. 629, 233 N.W. 439 (1930).
444 32 Wash. 2d 149, 201 P.2d 136 (1948).

445 Id. at 138.
446 Woodward v. Wakefield, 236 Mich. 417, 210 N.W. 322, 323 (1926)."
447
448
449

Wayman v. City of Cherokee, 204 Iowa 675, 215 N.W. 655 (1927).
97 N.J. Eq. 60, 127 AtI. 95 (1925).
227 Ark. 517, 299 S.W.2d 851 (1957).

450 Id. at 856.
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praise for the intentions of the father who was attempting to preserve land for
the building of a school, but the Court struck the contract down. The only conclusion to be drawn is that motives are probably not a significant factor unless
they would indicate an intent to cheat the public. But motives reflecting high
public spirit could certainly incline a court to a liberal view.
4. FederalTreatment
Though this survey is directed at state and municipal government problems,
little can be said without considering the treatment accorded the problem by the
federal government. It is certain that federal decisions cannot in any way be
binding upon the states. That, however, does not preclude a guidance by the
federal judiciary in the interpretation of conflict of interest statutes.
The most significant federal decision in the area of conflicts of interest is
United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co.,451 the heart of the Dixon-

Yates controversy. The case concerned the activities of a Mr. Wenzell, who was
a vice-president of First Boston Corporation, an important dealer and underwriter
of public utility securities. Mr. Wenzell had joined the government as an advisor
on interest costs while retaining his position with First Boston. Dixon and Yates
each represented major privately owned utilities in the South. The TVA was
seeking additional electric power to supply the AEC, and President Eisenhower
directed that it be supplied by private sources. Wenzell advised the government
in negotiations with Dixon's Southern Company and Yates' Middle South Utilities, each of which was a very good customer of First Boston. When the deal fell
through, the corporation which had been organized to supply the power, Mississippi
Valley Generating Company, sued to recover its out-of-pocket expenses and the
government challenged the contract claiming Wenzell had a conflict of interest.
Somewhat surprisingly the Supreme Court upheld the government's position.
Though there was some evidence that Wenzell had actually advised Dixon on a
related matter during the negotiations, there was no question of divulging a confidence. The Court said that Wenzell's employer, First Boston, stood to gain from
the contract and therefore Wenzell had an indirect interest in that contract. This
meant that the contract was void. At first glance one might say that Wenzell, as
a quasi-judicial official, had a subcontractor's interest in the contract and the
Supreme Court was merely applying the generally accepted principles in the area.
Mr. Justice Harlan, taking sharp issue with the majority, jointed out that there
was no agreement between First Boston and the Utilities; First Boston's interest
was at best speculative. "I do not mean to suggest that such an arrangement must
be evidenced by a formal agreement, for of course any sort of tacit understanding
or 'gentlemen's agreement' will suffice. But here
the Court of Claims has expressly
' 452
found against the existence of any such thing.

The Court in Mississippi Valley Generating was dealing with what was then
18 U.S.C. § 434.45, 3 It adopted a very rigid interpretation which apparently gives
little in the way of guidelines to the federal employee. ".

.

. the statute establishes

an objective, not a subjective, standard, and it is therefore of little moment whether
the agent thought he was violating the statute, if the objective facts show that there
was a conflict of interest." 454 18 U.S.C. § 434 has been replaced, however, by a
new set of federal standards. 455 Hopefully they will be a more helpful guide to
the federal employee than Mississippi Valley Generating.4s5
451
452
453
454

455

364 U.S. 520 (1961).
Id. at 569.
Repealed by PUB. L. 87-849, § 2, Oct. 23, 1962, 76 STAT. 1126.
364 U.S. at 560-61.

18 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq., especially § 208.

456 The repeal of 18 U.S.C. § 434 should not be understood as a disapproval of United
States v. Mississippi Valley Generating 'Co. See, S. REP,. No. 2213, 87th CoNG., 2d SEss.
(1962).
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B. Nepotism
Nepotism is the fine art of showing favoritism to relatives in the making of
appointments to jobs. It has been a particular problem in the sphere of public
employment.
Statutes prohibiting nepotism are fairly common and follow a general pattern.
They provide that no officer shall appoint to public office a person related to him
within a certain degree of affinity or consanguinity. One state permits closer relatives in affinity than consanguinity to be appointed.4 5 7 Florida permits the employment of one relative within the designated degree without a violation. 4 8 Iowa
exempts school teachers, 45 9 whereas South Dakota extends its proscription only to
school teachers.4 10 Maine also prohibits second cousins. 4 6' New Mexico permits
nepotism to a certain dollar limit in pay.46 2 Oklahoma extends the proscription
to appointments of other officers. 4G3 With these modifications, however, the antinepotism statutes are almost uniform attempts to deal with this problem. The
courts, as might be expected, have not been quite so uniform in their treatment
of the problem.
The courts do not disfavor anti-nepotism laws. The Supreme Court of Utah
in Backman v. Bateman4" approved the purpose of such laws by saying: "The
vice at which anti-nepotism statutes are aimed is avoiding inefficiency in public
office by preventing officials from favoring their relatives and appointing those
6
who may not be qualified to serve." 465 The Court then declared the Utah statute G
4
67
unconstitutional as applied to prior appointees.
The Supreme Court of Idaho
was much stronger: "Nepotism is recognized as an evil that ought to be eradicated
and stamped out ....,61 In spite of such a view, a few courts have taken some
force out of the laws by strict construction. In State ex rel. Robinson v. Keefe4 9
the Supreme Court of Florida said its anti-nepotism law should be "construed
strictly as an act of such highly penal character is required to be construed."470 It
held that teachers were not covered by the anti-nepotism law since they were
required to demonstrate their qualifications separately. In Ohio the Supreme Court
said the anti-nepotism law does not cover the wife of the
appointing official since
47
that relation is not within those enumerated by the statute. '
We do not mean to intimate that the decisions, such as Robinson, are unreasonable in this area, at least not all of them. But an example of questionable application seems to be raised in State ex rel. Hoagland v. School District No. 13 of
Prairie County.4 7 2 There the school district had only three persons who qualified
for membership on the school board, a man, his wife and his brother. The
children of the man and his wife were the only pupils. The Supreme Court of
Montana held that the employment of the wife to teach the children violated the
457 MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 59-519 (1947).
458 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 116.10 (1960).
459 IOWA CODE ANN. § 71.1 (1946).
460 S.D. CODE § 15.3814 (Supp. 1960).
461 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 10, § 22, Rule XXV (1954).
462

463
464
465

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-10 (1953)

(to $600).

tit. 21, § 483 (1951).
1 Utah 2d 153, 263 P.2d 561 (1953).
Id., 263 P.2d at 564. Accord, State ex inf. McKittrick v. Whittle, 333 Mo. 705, 63
OKLA. STAT. ANN.

S.W.2d 100 (1933).

§ 52-3-1 (1953).
To overcome this problem, an exception was made for prior appointees,
ANN. § 52-3-1(a) (1953).
468 Barton v. Alexander, 27 Idaho 286, 148 Pac. 471, 475 (1915).
469 111 Fla. 701, 149 So. 638 (1933).
466
467

UTAH CODE ANN.

470 Id., 149 So. at 638.

UTAH CODE

471 Board of Education of Zaleski School Dist. v. Boal, 104 Ohio St. 482, 135 N.E. 540
(1922).
472 116 Mont. 294, 151 P.2d 168 (1944).
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Montana Nepotism Act 473 and was therefore invalid. It is difficult to see whom

the act was protecting in this case.
It should be noted that unless provided by statute, the appointment of a
relative of another officer will be valid, 47 4 and that acts done by a person guilty
of making nepotistic appointments are still valid. 475 Also, absent statutory provisions, the civil law method of calculating degrees of relationship is used rather
than the common law method. 76 This shortens the reach of the statute since
fewer relations will fall within a certain degree under the civil law method.
Penalties for nepotism run from little more than statutory
suggestions that it
4 77
should not be done to substantial fines and imprisonment.
C. Dual Employment Limitations
At the outset we must distinguish between public officials who hold employment outside public office and those who hold a second public position.
Only one state outlaws private employment in addition to public position. 478
This appears strange since at first glance it would seem that such secondary private
employment would give rise to more significant problems than secondary public
employment. Upon consideration, however, the argument is that the only danger
from outside private employment is that of favoritism shown to the employer.
Arguably this danger is substantially met by the laws, both legislative and judicial,
against public servants having interests in contracts. To the extent that the interests in contracts doctrine meets the danger this is true. A case where the contracts
doctrine was sufficient is Stockton Plumbing & Supply Co. v. Wheeler.479 There
a city councilman was employed by a plumbing contractor dealing with the city
but the councilman refrained from voting on the contract. The Court said the
interest was sufficient to vitiate the contract. Even though the city charter provided that such contracts may be declared void by the council, the court said:
"... all such contracts made by the city should be absolutely void."48 0 Thus the
law on interests in contracts was sufficient to meet the problem, even to the extent
that the government body could not condone the interest of one of its members. 48 '
The kind of situation where the weakness of the contract interest doctrine to
deal with this problem becomes apparent was demonstrated in Pressey v. Township
of Hillsborough,482 where the mayor was also the salesman for a construction
equipment firm at the time the township was purchasing road graders. By rigging
the specifications he, in effect, had excluded all competition for his employer. The
Court ruled that there was not necessarily an interest in the contract, but that
the contract was brought about by improper influence and therefore void. This
illustrates the danger that absent some reliable criteria for protecting the public
interest, a significant loophole exists in attempts to curb such abuses.
The laws against dual public employment, fairly common, 48 3 seem to be
directed at an entirely different evil. Such a situation arises where a commission
or board finds that they need additional services and hire one of the members
473

MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 59-519 (1947).
474 State ex rel. McKittrick v. Becker, 336 Mo. 815, 81 S.W.2d 948 (1935).
475 State v. King, 379 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1964).
476 Graham County v. Buhl, 76 Ariz. 275, 263 P.2d 537 (1953).
477 Compare, N.Y. PUB. OFFIcERs LAW § 74 (no penalty), with, MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 59-520 (1947) ($50 to $1000 fine and/or not less than six months imprisonment).
478 CO NN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 4-8 (1958) ("no other gainful employment").
479 68 Cal. App. 592, 229 Pac. 1020 (1924).
480 Id., 229 Pac. at 1023.
481 Accord, People v. Elliott, 115 *C.A.2d 410, 252 P.2d 661 (1953); Miller v. City of
Martinez, 28 C.A.2d 364, 82 P.2d 519 (1938); State ex rel. Abernathy v. Anthony, 206 Tenn.
597, 335 S.W.2d 832 (1960).
482 37 N.J. Super. 486, 117 A.2d 646 (Ch. 1955).
483 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, § I (Smith-Hurd 1934); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 128-1
(1951).
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for that purpose. 41" In this area the law is fairly well settled. It is best expressed
by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in .describing the situation where hospital
trustees paid themselves for additional services they rendered. 8 5 ".... [Ain office
is taken cum onere, and public officers have no claim for official services rendered
except where, and to the extent that, compensation is provided by law."48 6 The
payments were therefore held illegal.
D. Post Employment Limitations
It has been argued that those limitations placed upon the public servant which
restrain him from taking personal advantage of the public trust should continue
to restrain him so long as it is reasonably possible that he could take advantage
of the public, even though his formal public employment may have ended. This
gives rise to the statutes which generally forbid a public officer or employee from
participating for a certain length of time in any matter which he was forbidden
to participate in while in office.
These laws have been passed by a few states4 87
4
and the federal government. 88
Questions concerning these limitations have not frequently reached the courts.
In Village of Bethesda v. Mallonee4' 9 the Court injected some equitable considerations to mitigate the effect of the statute. The Ohio statute" 0 proscribed contract
interests for one year after the termination of employment, but a member of the
village council entered into a contract to construct a fire house only five months
after resigning from the council. Since the village received full value, the Court
refused t6 undo the transaction.
More recently a California court voided a contract without the help of a
post employment statute by extending the contract interests doctrine. 49' The Court
said that the making of a contract includes the "planning, preliminary discussions,
492
compromises, drawing of plans and specifications and solicitation of bids ... . ,
Under this definition of a contract, his interest arose during his employment. Most
courts would probably follow California in this extension if it was found desirable
to avoid the contract. The meager authority, however, is hardly sufficient to indicate any judicial trends.
E. Codes of Ethics
As a new approach to the entire subject of conduct while in public office, it
has been suggested that the state enact a comprehensive code of ethics or set of
standards of conduct. The intent is to settle questions such as those discussed

above, and others, as can be seen by the statements of purpose incorporated into
some of the legislative enactments. Minnesota says: "... . a need exists to define
and regulate the conduct of public officials and employees to eliminate conflicts of
interest in public office so as to improve standards of public service and strengthen

the faith and confidence of the people of Minnesota in their government .... "93
This is based on the premise that "... high moral and ethical standards among

484 See Board of Comm'rs of Natrona County v. Casper Nael Bank, 56 Wyo. 132, 105
P.2d 578 (1940).
485 Golding v. Salter, 234 Miss. 567, 107 So. 2d 348 (1958).
486 Id., 107 So. 2d at 360.
487 Micn. STAT. ANN. § 5.353(4) (Supp. 1963) (one year); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 2301
(1956) (one year); OHro REv. CoD- ANN. § 2919.10 (Page 1953) (one year),; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, § 776.3 (1962) (advisor may never be interested in a contract he recommends);
TENN. CoD ANN. § 12-403 (1956) (cannot bid on contract for six months).
488 18 U.S.C. § 207 (may never be interested in a matter worked on; one year for matters for which officer was responsible).
489 60 Ohio Op. 107, 136 N.E.2d 457 (C.P. 1955).
490 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.10 (Page 1953).
491 Stigall v. City of Taft, 52 Cal. 2d 565, 375 P.2d 289 (1962).
492 Id., 375 P.2d at 292.
493 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.87 (Supp. 1964).
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public officers and employees ... are essential to the conduct of free government ....
Unfortunately, these statements of purpose and requirements are
the most significant part of the Minnesota statute which they describe as their
code of ethics. It provides only for the establishment of legislative committees4 95
and that the head of each agency shall promulgate a "code of public service ethics
appropriate to the specific needs of such agency"49 6 for the guidance of the officers
and employees.
Other states have formulated much more substantial plans for dealing with
the subject. Kentucky is more specific in its statement of purpose, prescribing
"specific standards" with the bulk of the provisions carrying out this intent. 497
Kentucky apparently was impressed by the New York provision, enacted in 1955,498
which was the first true code of ethics as an exhaustive guide for the conduct of
public office. Massachusetts 499' and Washington 50 are the other two states which
have attempted such a complete guideline. All four states also make specific provisions forbidding interests in contracts,501 Kentucky and Massachusetts, however,
making certain percentage allowances for corporate interests. 502 All, except Washington, have some form of dual employment limitation,50 3 though New York phrases
it in5 05very broad terms, 0 4 and Kentucky's applies only to members of the legislature.
The conduct sought to be guided by their codes of ethics is more extensive,
however, than those areas such as interests in contracts and dual employment which
are already covered by law in many states. New York, Massachusetts and Washington have provisions to the effect that public officers and employees sfould not
disclose confidential information and should not place themselves in a position
where they would have to.50 6 They also have provisions that no officer or employee
should use his office for special privileges. 50 7 New York and Massachusetts have
extended their provisions to require that their public officers and employees conduct themselves so as not to give a poor impression or raise suspicion among the
public.50s These provisions thus go to the heart of the matter more than any other.
They are enactments implementing the idea expressed in the Minnesota statement
of purpose,509 that the confidence of the people is an essential element in a free
government. This idea comes closest to covering all of the laws discussed under
the heading of conflicts of interest.
All of the material on conflicts of interest revolves around the concept that
"14

494

Ibid.

495 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.89 (Supp. 1964).
496 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.91 (Supp. 1964).
497 Ky. REv. STAT. § 61.092 (1963).
498 N.Y. PuB. OFFICERS LAW § 74.
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no man can serve two masters. 10 For the public servant there can be only one
master, the interest of the public. When that public servant's private, personal
interest in any matter relating to his public responsibility reaches the level where
it threatens to challenge his devotion to the public, the law seeks to intervene. In
the past it has achieved this intervention by proscription and criminal sanctions,
and this is still the pattern in most states. It is to be hoped that if the people can
state succinctly, through their legislature, what it expects of its employees, we can
maximize the public benefit consistent with the maximum freedom for individual
public employees. Thus our law would be preventive rather than only punitive.
THOMAS J. KENNEY, JR.

PAUL V. NIEMEYER
MICHAEL F. DEL FRA
Ross W. PETERSON

510 Matt. 6:24. The District Court of Appeal in California has approved the strength of
this principle, commenting, "The voice of divinity, speaking from within the sublimest incarnation known to all history, proclaimed and emphasized the maxim nearly two thousand
years ago on occasions of infinite sacredness." Stockton Plumbing & Supply Co. v. Wheeler,
68 Cal. App. 592, 229 Pac. 1020, 1024 (1924).

